[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20080813144040.30d40ec5@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2008 14:40:40 +0100
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Kenneth Goldman <kgoldman@...ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] integrity: TPM internel kernel interface
> "goodies", the TCG technology does not protect against hardware
> attacks such as replacing the TPM with a bogus device, replacing the
> CRTM hardware, flashing the CRTM using a JTAG cable, lifting a TPM pin>
> and asserting reset, using a JTAG cable to set breakpoints and alter
> memory, etc.
>
> For this use case, the attack model is a remote, software attack. The>
> user is not considered the attacker.
Surely if I can replace your TPM with alternative hardware then I can
also replace it with virtualised software traps.
[If there is a good document on this btw please just point me there
instead and I'll go read further]
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists