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Message-ID: <g8053f$osb$1@ger.gmane.org>
Date:	Wed, 13 Aug 2008 22:25:49 -0400
From:	7v5w7go9ub0o <7v5w7go9ub0o@...il.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	malware-list@...ts.printk.net
Subject:  Re: TALPA - a threat model?  well sorta.

7v5w7go9ub0o wrote:

> 
> 4. Again, my hope for libmalware.so/dazuko is a realtime
> integrity-management link.
> 
> <end posts>
> 
> HTH
> 
> p.s. The question has developed, should this monitor root activities. 
> IMHO, the answer is a definite YES!  We are most vulnerable during 
> software updating; AntiMailware signatures may stop the compilation or 
> installation of a Trojan - by root.
> 

I just noticed a separate discussion about integrity-checking LKMs and LSMs.

Obviously, a libmalware.so or Dazuko based integrity-checker would block 
a kernel from loading in a Trojaned LKM - noting that the MD5 had 
changed, and asking you to block, temporarily allow, or permanently 
allow the changed module.

Another security benefit of your pursuit.

HTH







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