linux-kernel - Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to alinuxinterfaceforon access scanning

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Date:	Fri, 15 Aug 2008 15:18:55 +0100
From:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To:	rmeijer@...all.nl
Cc:	capibara@...all.nl, david@...g.hm,
	"Eric Paris" <eparis@...hat.com>, "Theodore Tso" <tytso@....edu>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@...hat.com>, davecb@....com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	"Adrian Bunk" <bunk@...nel.org>,
	"Mihai Don??u" <mdontu@...defender.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, malware-list@...ts.printk.net,
	"Pavel Machek" <pavel@...e.cz>,
	"Arjan van de Ven" <arjan@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to	alinuxinterfaceforon
           access scanning

> This "permitted to execute" is what I feel is the wrong aproach with
> respect to malware. If you simply allow everything to 'execute', I think
> that untrusted programs may still be used for usefull things, but without
> the potential do do malice. If you start from the point where everything
> both trusted and untrusted  is permitted to be executed, you could make it
> the job of SELinux or any other LSM to make untrusted code run without
> doing malice, but with the possibility to still run and do usefull non
> malicious  stuff. This might require some aditional hooks in LSM though I
> could imagine.

SELinux is quite happy to apply different rules to content labelled in
different ways. WHat specific things do you need that it can't do ?
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