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Message-Id: <1219676185.2627.1.camel@moss-terrapins.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date:	Mon, 25 Aug 2008 10:56:25 -0400
From:	"David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc:	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	SELinux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy

On Fri, 2008-08-22 at 14:34 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> In August 2006 I posted a patch to the selinux list generating a minimal
> SELinux policy.  This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version
> of that as a patch against the kernel.  In addition to some fixes, also
> had nice logic for auto-installing the policy.
> 
> I've gone ahead and hooked it into the kernel Makefile logic.  The way I
> have it here, doing 'make scripts' ends up compiling 'mdp', after which
> you must
> 	cd scripts/selinux
> 	sh install_policy.sh
> 
> That isn't as nice as being able to do
> 	make selinux_install
> the way David had it, but it avoids mucking with the top-level
> Makefile.  Which is preferred?
> 
> In any case, this seems like a good thing to have in the kernel
> tree, to facilitate simple selinux boot tests.
> 
> Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially
> bc it has stats on the generated policies):
> 
> ======================================================================
> For those interested in the changes there were only two significant
> changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes
> used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the
> class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place
> holders for the user space object classes.
> 
> The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids
> table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration
> has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL.
> 
> Some statistics on the policy that it generates:
> 
> The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those
> 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid
> definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy
> developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions.
> Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user
> statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first
> group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the
> second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27
> lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11.
> 
> In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts
> file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t.
> 
> This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes.
> ======================================================================
> (then a few versions later...):
> ======================================================================
> The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those
> lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining
> 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the
> allow rules (one for each object class including user space object
> classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for
> file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes.
> ======================================================================
> 
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>

[Snip...]

I'm not sure if I have to sign off on this but just in case.

Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@...ho.nsa.gov>

Dave

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