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Message-ID: <20080827134853.19980.45910.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:	Wed, 27 Aug 2008 14:48:53 +0100
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>,
	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
	Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 37/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NFS daemon

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@...ldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>
Cc: linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org
---

 fs/nfsd/vfs.c |    6 +++---
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)


diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index e3e37f7..34d2ade 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ nfsd_create_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *resfhp,
 	 * send along the gid on create when it tries to implement
 	 * setgid directories via NFS:
 	 */
-	if (current->fsuid != 0)
+	if (current_fsuid() != 0)
 		iap->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID);
 	if (iap->ia_valid)
 		return nfsd_setattr(rqstp, resfhp, iap, 0, (time_t)0);
@@ -1998,7 +1998,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
 		IS_APPEND(inode)?	" append" : "",
 		__mnt_is_readonly(exp->ex_path.mnt)?	" ro" : "");
 	dprintk("      owner %d/%d user %d/%d\n",
-		inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current->fsuid, current->fsgid);
+		inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid());
 #endif
 
 	/* Normally we reject any write/sattr etc access on a read-only file
@@ -2041,7 +2041,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
 	 * with NFSv3.
 	 */
 	if ((acc & NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE) &&
-	    inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
+	    inode->i_uid == current_fsuid())
 		return 0;
 
 	/* This assumes  NFSD_MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} == MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} */

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