2.6.25-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: Vlad Yasevich [ Upstream commit 30c2235cbc477d4629983d440cdc4f496fec9246 ] The structure used for SCTP_AUTH_KEY option contains a length that needs to be verfied to prevent buffer overflow conditions. Spoted by Eugene Teo . Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++++ net/sctp/socket.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) --- a/net/sctp/auth.c +++ b/net/sctp/auth.c @@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ static struct sctp_auth_bytes *sctp_auth { struct sctp_auth_bytes *key; + /* Verify that we are not going to overflow INT_MAX */ + if ((INT_MAX - key_len) < sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes)) + return NULL; + /* Allocate the shared key */ key = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes) + key_len, gfp); if (!key) --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3072,6 +3072,11 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(stru goto out; } + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, authkey->sca_assoc_id); if (!asoc && authkey->sca_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP)) { ret = -EINVAL; -- -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/