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Message-Id: <1220609647.4879.169.camel@pasglop>
Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2008 20:14:07 +1000
From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
To: pageexec@...email.hu
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...e.hu, tglx@...x.de,
hpa@...or.org
Subject: Re: [patch] Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch
On Fri, 2008-09-05 at 11:43 +0200, pageexec@...email.hu wrote:
> > I'd have considered taking your email serious if you had left out the
> > uncalled and unneeded sarcasm line at the end.
>
> consider how your whole patch is based on one big self-contradiction.
> you already assume that the attacker *can* modify arbitrary kernel memory
> (even the otherwise *read-only* syscall table at that), but at the very
> same time you're saying he *can't* use the same powers to patch out your
> 'protection' or do many other things to evade it. as it is, it's cargo cult
> security at its best, reminding one on the Vista kernel's similar 'protection'
> mechanism for the service descriptor tables...
Well, I see it a different way ... it will once for all screw up
binary modules that try to add syscalls :-)
Ben.
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