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Message-ID: <20080905090559.7cbc74f3@infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2008 09:05:59 -0700
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>
To: pageexec@...email.hu
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mingo@...e.hu, tglx@...x.de, hpa@...or.org,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
Subject: Re: [patch] Add basic sanity checks to the syscall execution patch
On Fri, 05 Sep 2008 11:43:31 +0200
pageexec@...email.hu wrote:
> consider how your whole patch is based on one big self-contradiction.
> you already assume that the attacker *can* modify arbitrary kernel
> memory (even the otherwise *read-only* syscall table at that), but at
> the very same time you're saying he *can't* use the same powers to
> patch out your 'protection' or do many other things to evade it. as
> it is, it's cargo cult security at its best, reminding one on the
> Vista kernel's similar 'protection' mechanism for the service
> descriptor tables...
so I'm not going to say that the patch is important or good;
it's the result of ben mentioning the idea on irc and me thinking "sure
lets see what it would take and cost".
Nothing more than that
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