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Message-Id: <1221156612.17533.14.camel@amilo>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 20:10:12 +0200
From: Miloslav Trmač <mitr@...hat.com>
To: John Dennis <jdennis@...hat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
linux-audit <linux-audit@...hat.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] audit: fix NUL handling in untrusted strings
John Dennis píše v Čt 11. 09. 2008 v 13:30 -0400:
> Special processing with regards to the presence or absence of a null
> byte is one example of prohibited interpretation.
This is UNIX, "string" means "NUL-terminated string" (in fact the
presence of a NUL byte is the only way to reasonably detect binary
data).
You're far more likely to encounter a fixed-length field with an
optional terminating NUL (like the old-style, 16-byte directory entries)
than an ASCII-compatible string that intentionally contains a NUL byte.
TTY input auditing was the only place where it makes a difference, all
other code was passing a string that was at least as long as the
specified size to audit_log_n_untrustedstring().
> It seems to me the problem is with audit_string_contains_control():
>
> int audit_string_contains_control(const char *string, size_t len)
> {
> const unsigned char *p;
> for (p = string; p < (const unsigned char *)string + len && *p; p
> ++) {
> if (*p == '"' || *p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7e)
> return 1;
> }
> return 0;
> }
>
> The problem is that it is passed a counted octet sequence but in some
> circumstances ignores the count. This occurs when *p == 0, the test
> for NULL should be removed. If that test is removed it will return the
> flag which indicates the string must be encoded differently to be
> conformant with the protocol.
Yes, that's possible - but then audit_log_n_untrustedstring() would be
more accurately called audit_log_n_ascii_like_binary_data().
Anyway, Eric/Al - if you prefer this solution, I can prepare an
alternative patch.
> As a side note I'm concerned there may be places in the user audit
> code which treat string data as null terminated (at least that is my
> recollection).
Yes, auditd adds a NUL terminator to the audit record, and then treats
it as a regular NUL-terminated string; if the audit record contains an
embedded NUL byte, the rest of the record is discarded by auditd.
Mirek
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