linux-kernel - Re: [Bug #11500] /proc/net bug related to selinux

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1221741521.24048.17.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date:	Thu, 18 Sep 2008 08:38:41 -0400
From:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>, jmorris@...ei.org, rjw@...k.pl,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-testers@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Bug #11500] /proc/net bug related to selinux

On Wed, 2008-09-17 at 15:32 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
> 
> > We don't even know the extent of the damage yet.  Which distros were
> > affected? With which versions of which userspace packages?
> 
> This seems to me to be an extremely fragile selinux user space policy.
> In their code that derives security labels from path names.
> Why don't we have AppArmor in the kernel again?

I think I explained that one before - in the case of /proc, the only
stable basis we have for deducing the security properties / protection
requirements for a given entry is its name, and its name can be reliably
constructed from the kernel's internal proc_dir_entry tree w/o any
ambiguity or potential for userspace manipulation (unlike the pathname
returned by d_path for a normal file).  I'd agree that it isn't optimal,
but it is what we have.

> Further I don't see how we could have possibly have supported that user space
> policy.  How can we apply a user space defined label required by the selinux
> policy to a symlink that did not exist?

I'm not blaming anyone here, or trying to argue that the /proc/net
changes should be reverted.  What happened here is that a kernel
interface (/proc/net) changed in a subtle way that had a side effect on
permission checking, and we tried to hide that change at the time (in
terms of ensuring that the new /proc/self/net tree would still be
labeled correctly), and we missed the fact that there would still be a
new check on the symlink read that wouldn't be covered by existing
policy.

> Everything here sounds to me like that selinux policy is impossibly brittle.
> And anything that is that brittle I have no intention in claiming is a bug
> in proc.

I'm not arguing that this is a bug in proc or in selinux for that
matter.

I do however think that the mantra that we can't require users to update
policy for kernel changes is unsupportable in general.  The precise set
of permission checks on a given operation is not set in stone and it is
not part of the kernel/userland interface/contract.  Policy isn't
"userspace"; it governs what userspace can do, and it has to adapt to
kernel changes.

Users who are willing/able to run the latest kernel on their own w/o
waiting for a coordinated update of kernel and policy from their
distribution ought to be able to create a local policy module - it isn't
rocket science, and they can always fall back on audit2allow if they
need to do so.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/