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Message-Id: <200810021952.GFJ87098.VQFtMOHJOFFLSO@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2008 19:52:15 +0900
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] CRED: ptrace_attach() should use the target process's mutex
Hello.
TOMOYO Linux is now trying to use CRED API, but some troubles were found.
Thus, I want the below patch for TOMOYO Linux.
Regards.
-----
Subject: Add hooks for notifying of start/finish of an execve operation.
This patch adds two hooks, security_start_execve() / security_finish_execve(),
for notifying an LSM module of an execve operation is about to start and
finish.
TOMOYO Linux checks read and/or write permissions at security_dentry_open()
if security_dentry_open() is called outside do_execve() (e.g. sys_open()).
But TOMOYO Linux wants to skip permission checks at security_dentry_open()
if security_dentry_open() is called inside do_execve() (i.e. open_exec()), for
TOMOYO Linux checks permissions at security_bprm_check() using
current->cred->security for program and bprm->cred->security for interpreter.
To implement this exception, I have to tell whether TOMOYO Linux should do
permission checks at security_dentry_open(). And I want a flag that tells
whether the current process is in an execve operation or not.
I tried to use
static int tmy_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
{
...
/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
if (mutex_is_locked(¤t->cred_exec_mutex))
return 0;
...
}
for judging whether the current process is in an execve operation or not.
But it turned out that this code won't work because current->cred_exec_mutex
can be locked by other processes. Thus, I'm trying to use
struct execve_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct task_struct *task;
};
static LIST_HEAD(execve_list);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(execve_list_lock);
static int tmy_start_execve(void)
{
struct execve_entry *ee = kmalloc(sizeof(*ee), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ee)
return -ENOMEM;
ee->task = current;
spin_lock(&execve_list_lock);
list_add(&ee->list, &execve_list);
spin_unlock(&execve_list_lock);
return 0;
}
static bool tmy_in_execve(void)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
struct execve_entry *p;
bool found = false;
spin_lock(&execve_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(p, &execve_list, list) {
if (p->task != task)
continue;
found = true;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&execve_list_lock);
return found;
}
static void tmy_finish_execve(void)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
struct execve_entry *p;
struct execve_entry *ee = NULL;
spin_lock(&execve_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(p, &execve_list, list) {
if (p->task != task)
continue;
list_del(&p->list);
ee = p;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&execve_list_lock);
if (ee)
kfree(ee);
}
and replace mutex_is_locked(¤t->cred_exec_mutex) with tmy_in_execve().
To call tmy_start_execve() and tmy_finish_execve(),
I want security_start_execve() / security_finish_execve().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
fs/compat.c | 6 ++++++
fs/exec.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/security.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
security/capability.c | 11 +++++++++++
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++
5 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
--- linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1.orig/fs/compat.c
+++ linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1/fs/compat.c
@@ -1397,6 +1397,10 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
+ retval = security_start_execve();
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (!bprm->cred)
@@ -1448,6 +1452,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
+ security_finish_execve();
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1464,6 +1469,7 @@ out_file:
}
out_unlock:
+ security_finish_execve();
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
out_free:
--- linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1.orig/fs/exec.c
+++ linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1/fs/exec.c
@@ -1302,6 +1302,10 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
+ retval = security_start_execve();
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (!bprm->cred)
@@ -1354,6 +1358,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
+ security_finish_execve();
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1372,6 +1377,7 @@ out_file:
}
out_unlock:
+ security_finish_execve();
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
out_free:
--- linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1.orig/include/linux/security.h
+++ linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1/include/linux/security.h
@@ -192,6 +192,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
* should enable secure mode.
* @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ * @start_execve:
+ * Notify current process of an execve operation is about to start.
+ * This is called immediately after obtaining current->cred_exec_mutex
+ * mutex.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @finish_execve:
+ * Notify current process of an execve operation is about to finish.
+ * This is called immediately before releasing current->cred_exec_mutex
+ * mutex.
*
* Security hooks for filesystem operations.
*
@@ -1352,6 +1361,8 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*settime) (struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
+ int (*start_execve) (void);
+ void (*finish_execve) (void);
int (*bprm_set_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1632,6 +1643,8 @@ int security_syslog(int type);
int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages);
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
+int security_start_execve(void);
+void security_finish_execve(void);
int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1879,6 +1892,15 @@ static inline int security_vm_enough_mem
return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
}
+static inline int security_start_execve(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_finish_execve(void)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
--- linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1.orig/security/capability.c
+++ linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1/security/capability.c
@@ -32,6 +32,15 @@ static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *d
return 0;
}
+static int cap_start_execve(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cap_finish_execve(void)
+{
+}
+
static int cap_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
@@ -877,6 +886,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, start_execve);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, finish_execve);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_creds);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committing_creds);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committed_creds);
--- linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1.orig/security/security.c
+++ linux-2.6.27-rc7-mm1/security/security.c
@@ -199,6 +199,16 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct
return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
}
+int security_start_execve(void)
+{
+ return security_ops->start_execve();
+}
+
+void security_finish_execve(void)
+{
+ security_ops->finish_execve();
+}
+
int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
--
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