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Message-ID: <20081009182149.GE12507@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2008 20:21:49 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@...e.cz>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Cc: "Cihula, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "Wang, Shane" <shane.wang@...el.com>,
"Wei, Gang" <gang.wei@...el.com>,
"Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...hat.com>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...ell.com>, mingo@...e.hu, tytso@....edu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0a/3] TXT: Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology
support for Linux - Overview
On Thu 2008-10-09 11:14:51, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Pavel Machek (pavel@...e.cz) wrote:
> > I have never used trusted boot and I'm not sure I want to. Why would I
> > want to do that?
>
> So that you can reason that you've booted kernel/initrd that you wanted
> to (and have established a root of trust for follow-on, like Joe's IMA
> example), and in the case that you didn't (say bluepill), you have a
> policy in place to handle it.
So like... instead of booting into rootkit it now will not boot at
all?
> > You exit/reenter the trusted mode accross sleep... so any guarantees
> > "trusted" mode does are void, right?
>
> You exit from kernel to tboot on any shutdown, which handles the proper
> teardown of the measured env (meaning you also come back on via tboot).
> So things like saving tpm state, scrubbing secrets from memory, etc.
Aha, so instead sleep mode is useless because I'll have to remount all
the crypto filesystems and restart all the apps...
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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