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Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2008 16:34:32 +0900
From: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Toshiharu Harada <haradats@...data.co.jp>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Subject: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 09/11] LSM adapter functions.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@...data.co.jp>
---
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 376 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h | 105 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 481 insertions(+)
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+ *
+ * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+static int tmy_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ /*
+ * Since "struct domain_info *" is a sharable pointer, we don't need
+ * to duplicate.
+ */
+ new->security = old->security;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /*
+ * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
+ * operation.
+ */
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
+ * for the first time.
+ */
+ if (!sbin_init_started)
+ tmy_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+ /*
+ * Tell tmy_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
+ * execve operation.
+ */
+ bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+
+ /*
+ * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
+ * using current domain.
+ */
+ if (!domain) {
+ struct domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
+ int retval = tmy_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
+
+ if (!retval)
+ bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
+ * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
+ */
+ return tmy_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+}
+
+static int tmy_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+ int error;
+ char *name;
+
+ op &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE;
+ if (!op)
+ return 0;
+ name = sysctlpath_from_table(table);
+ if (!name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ error = tmy_check_file_perm(tmy_domain(), name, op);
+ tmy_free(name);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_update_result - Update error code.
+ *
+ * @error: Return code from security_path_*().
+ *
+ * To be able to return DAC's error (if any) to the caller instead of
+ * MAC's error, we don't return MAC's error at security_path_*().
+ *
+ * We remember MAC's error only if security_path_*() returned an error.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise if @error != 0.
+ * Returns previously saved error code and clears it if @error == 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_update_result(int error)
+{
+ /* Structure for holding the result of security_path_*(). */
+ struct check_result_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct task_struct *task; /* = current */
+ int error; /* != 0 */
+ };
+ static LIST_HEAD(list);
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+ struct task_struct *task = current;
+ struct check_result_entry *entry;
+ if (!error) {
+ if (!list_empty(&list)) {
+ struct check_result_entry *p;
+ entry = NULL;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ spin_lock(&lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(p, &list, list) {
+ if (p->task != task)
+ continue;
+ list_del(&p->list);
+ entry = p;
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ if (entry) {
+ error = entry->error;
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
+ }
+ return error;
+ }
+ entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ entry->task = task;
+ entry->error = error;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ spin_lock(&lock);
+ list_add(&entry->list, &list);
+ spin_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_save_result - Remember error code for security_inode_*() if any.
+ *
+ * @error: Return code from security_path_*().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ *
+ * We don't save if @error == 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_save_result(const int error)
+{
+ return error ? tmy_update_result(error) : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_load_result - Fetch error code for security_inode_*().
+ *
+ * Returns error code saved by security_path_*().
+ */
+static int tmy_load_result(void)
+{
+ return tmy_update_result(0);
+}
+
+/* Clear error code in case security_inode_*() was not called. */
+static void tmy_path_clear(void)
+{
+ tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+ unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
+{
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+ path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL,
+ &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL,
+ &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL,
+ &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL,
+ &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ unsigned int dev)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ int type = TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL;
+
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFCHR:
+ type = TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL;
+ break;
+ case S_IFBLK:
+ type = TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL;
+ break;
+ case S_IFIFO:
+ type = TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL;
+ break;
+ case S_IFSOCK:
+ type = TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ type, &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+ struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_2path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL,
+ &path1, &path2));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_rename(struct path *old_parent, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_parent, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
+ struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
+ return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_2path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+ TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL,
+ &path1, &path2));
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mask)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+ return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
+ return tmy_check_rewrite_permission(tmy_domain(), file);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ int flags = f->f_flags;
+
+ if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
+ flags++;
+ flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
+ /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
+ if (current->in_execve)
+ return 0;
+ return tmy_check_open_permission(tmy_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
+}
+
+static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
+ .name = "tomoyo",
+ .cred_prepare = tmy_cred_prepare,
+ .bprm_set_creds = tmy_bprm_set_creds,
+ .bprm_check_security = tmy_bprm_check_security,
+ .sysctl = tmy_sysctl,
+ .file_fcntl = tmy_file_fcntl,
+ .dentry_open = tmy_dentry_open,
+ .path_truncate = tmy_path_truncate,
+ .path_unlink = tmy_path_unlink,
+ .path_mkdir = tmy_path_mkdir,
+ .path_rmdir = tmy_path_rmdir,
+ .path_symlink = tmy_path_symlink,
+ .path_mknod = tmy_path_mknod,
+ .path_link = tmy_path_link,
+ .path_rename = tmy_path_rename,
+ .inode_create = tmy_inode_create,
+ .inode_setattr = tmy_inode_setattr,
+ .inode_unlink = tmy_inode_unlink,
+ .inode_mkdir = tmy_inode_mkdir,
+ .inode_rmdir = tmy_inode_rmdir,
+ .inode_symlink = tmy_inode_symlink,
+ .inode_mknod = tmy_inode_mknod,
+ .inode_link = tmy_inode_link,
+ .inode_rename = tmy_inode_rename,
+ .path_clear = tmy_path_clear,
+};
+
+static int __init tmy_init(void)
+{
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+
+ if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+ return 0;
+ /* register ourselves with the security framework */
+ if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+ panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+ cred->security = &KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(tmy_init);
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+
+struct path_info;
+struct path;
+struct inode;
+struct linux_binprm;
+struct pt_regs;
+struct tmy_page_buffer;
+
+int tmy_check_file_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const char *filename,
+ const u8 perm);
+int tmy_check_exec_perm(struct domain_info *domain,
+ const struct path_info *filename,
+ struct tmy_page_buffer *buf);
+int tmy_check_open_permission(struct domain_info *domain, struct path *path,
+ const int flag);
+int tmy_check_1path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+ struct path *path);
+int tmy_check_2path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+ struct path *path1, struct path *path2);
+int tmy_check_rewrite_permission(struct domain_info *domain,
+ struct file *filp);
+int tmy_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ struct domain_info **next_domain);
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+
+#define TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL 0
+#define TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL 1
+
+/* Index numbers for File Controls. */
+
+/*
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set
+ * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set.
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are
+ * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared.
+ */
+
+#define TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL 0
+#define TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL 1
+#define TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL 2
+#define TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL 3
+#define TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL 4
+#define TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL 5
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL 6
+#define TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL 7
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL 8
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL 9
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL 10
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL 11
+#define TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL 12
+#define TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL 13
+#define TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL 14
+#define MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15
+
+#define TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL 0
+#define TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL 1
+#define MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2
+
+#define TMY_DOMAINPOLICY 0
+#define TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY 1
+#define TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS 2
+#define TMY_PROCESS_STATUS 3
+#define TMY_MEMINFO 4
+#define TMY_SELFDOMAIN 5
+#define TMY_VERSION 6
+#define TMY_PROFILE 7
+#define TMY_MANAGER 8
+#define TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER 9
+
+extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+
+static inline struct domain_info *tmy_domain(void)
+{
+ return current_cred()->security;
+}
+
+/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */
+static inline struct domain_info *tmy_real_domain(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+ struct domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+
+ put_cred(cred);
+ return domain;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */
--
--
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