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Message-Id: <1225045593.14057.11.camel@localhost>
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2008 19:26:33 +0100
From: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
lethal@...ux-sh.org, paulus@...ba.org, benh@...nel.crashing.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] s390 updates for 2.6.28-rc1
On Fri, 2008-10-24 at 13:37 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > The s390 vdso preparation patch "arch_setup_additional_pages argument"
> > touches other architectures (x86, sh and powerpc):
> >
> > arch_setup_additional_pages currently gets two arguments, the binary
> > format descripton and an indication if the process uses an executable
> > stack or not. The second argument is not used by anybody, it could be
> > removed without replacement.
>
> hm, this is the first time i've seen this change,
The code is relatively new and I planned it for the merge window for
2.6.29. I still have to nag our performance team to do some tests with
it.
> and it looks a bit weird:
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
>
> #define ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES 1
> extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
> - int executable_stack);
> + int uses_interp);
>
> why didnt you just add a new uses_interp argument?
I could have but I noticed at the same time that executable_stack is
unused. If somebody finds a need for the executable_stack argument it
can easily re-added but I can't think of a use for it. Ergo I removed
it.
> executable_stack is passed in to potentially enable architectures to be
> aware of how conservative/legacy the address-space of the binary is -
> whether to randomize the vdso, etc. exec-shield used to take advantage
> of that.
What has address space layout / randomization to do with
executable_stack? You lost me there.
> But there seems to be no in-tree use of that (and if one arises it can
> just add back that parameter), and i dont want to stand in the way of
> your pull request either, so for the x86 bits:
>
> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Thanks. I'll add it.
--
blue skies,
Martin.
"Reality continues to ruin my life." - Calvin.
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