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Message-ID: <20081030152940.GA24853@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2008 10:29:40 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov,
jmorris@...eil.org, morgan@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
esandeen@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v1 1/3] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface
Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@...hat.com):
> Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
> make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently
> this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
> the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
> algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
> likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be
> audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be
> possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
> by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
> interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
> indirection.
>
> This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
> flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1.
I.e.
#define CAP_NOAUDIT 0
#define CAP_AUDIT 1
Otherwise, looks fine.
thanks,
-serge
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