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Message-Id: <1225812122.11720.17.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2008 10:22:02 -0500
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
serue@...ibm.com, morgan@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
esandeen@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v2 1/3] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface
On Mon, 2008-11-03 at 16:27 -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
> Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
> make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently
> this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
> the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
> algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
> likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be
> audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be
> possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
> by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
> interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
> indirection.
>
> This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
> flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
You could further simplify the hooks where we already (before this
patch) split the capability check into separate secondary_ops->capable()
and avc_has_perm_noaudit() calls since you can now just call your new
_noaudit interface there.
But the patch appears to be correct.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
> ---
>
> include/linux/capability.h | 3 +++
> include/linux/security.h | 16 +++++++++++++---
> security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++----
> security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
> 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 9d1fe30..0a0379b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
>
> kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new);
>
> +extern int security_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
> +extern int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
> /**
> * has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
> * @t: The task in question
> @@ -514,6 +516,7 @@ kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new);
> * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
> */
> #define has_capability(t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
> +#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
>
> extern int capable(int cap);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index c13f1ce..5fe28a6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,10 @@
> /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
> #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
>
> +/* If capable should audit the security request */
> +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
> +#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1
> +
> struct ctl_table;
> struct audit_krule;
>
> @@ -44,7 +48,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
> * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
> * as the default capabilities functions
> */
> -extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
> +extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
> extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
> extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> @@ -1307,7 +1311,7 @@ struct security_operations {
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> - int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
> + int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
> int (*acct) (struct file *file);
> int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
> int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
> @@ -1577,6 +1581,7 @@ void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
> +int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
> int security_acct(struct file *file);
> int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
> int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
> @@ -1782,7 +1787,12 @@ static inline void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,
>
> static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> {
> - return cap_capable(tsk, cap);
> + return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +{
> + return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> }
>
> static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 3976613..73999f6 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
> * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
> * returns 1 for this case.
> */
> -int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
> {
> /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
> if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
> @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
> * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
> * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
> */
> - return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
> + return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0);
> }
>
> static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
> @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
> & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
> || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
> - || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
> + || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
> /*
> * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
> * [2] no unlocking of locks
> @@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> {
> int cap_sys_admin = 0;
>
> - if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
> + if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
> cap_sys_admin = 1;
> return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index c0acfa7..346f21e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -163,7 +163,12 @@ void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,
>
> int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> {
> - return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
> + return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +}
> +
> +int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +{
> + return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> }
>
> int security_acct(struct file *file)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f85597a..ee34fbf 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1365,12 +1365,14 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
>
> /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
> static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
> - int cap)
> + int cap, int audit)
> {
> struct task_security_struct *tsec;
> struct avc_audit_data ad;
> + struct av_decision avd;
> u16 sclass;
> u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
> + int rc;
>
> tsec = tsk->security;
>
> @@ -1390,7 +1392,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
> "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
> BUG();
> }
> - return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
> +
> + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
> + if (audit)
> + avc_audit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
> + return rc;
> }
>
> /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
> @@ -1801,15 +1807,15 @@ static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effecti
> secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
> }
>
> -static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
> {
> int rc;
>
> - rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
> + rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
> - return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
> + return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
> }
>
> static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
> @@ -1974,7 +1980,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
> struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
>
> - rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> if (rc == 0)
> rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
> SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
> @@ -2821,7 +2827,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
> * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
> * in-core context value, not a denial.
> */
> - error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
> + error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> if (!error)
> error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
> SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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