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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.1.10.0811180811500.10839@tundra.namei.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2008 08:12:20 +1100 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, serue@...ibm.com, morgan@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v2] capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when
file caps are not enabled
On Fri, 14 Nov 2008, Eric Paris wrote:
> When CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set the audit system may
> try to call into the capabilities function vfs_cap_from_file. This
> patch defines that function so kernels can build and work.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
This needs to be a patch against the 'next' branch of the security-testing
tree.
>
> ---
>
> james morris didn't like the fact I was clearing the cpu_caps struct.
> So this patch makes the error handling better so I don't need to.
> (actually I didn't need to fix the error handling since this audit
> function is only called when fcaps are enabled and we already got the
> xattr data once, but still, this is the right fix)
>
> kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++----
> security/commoncap.c | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index cef3423..90b0544 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2556,6 +2556,13 @@ void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_
> struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
> struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
> struct dentry *dentry;
> + int ret;
> +
> + dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
> + ret = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
> + dput(dentry);
> + if (ret)
> + return;
>
> ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!ax)
> @@ -2565,10 +2572,6 @@ void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_
> ax->d.next = context->aux;
> context->aux = (void *)ax;
>
> - dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
> - get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
> - dput(dentry);
> -
> ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
> ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
> ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 0b88160..22b9270 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -337,6 +337,11 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
> +{
> + return -ENODATA;
> +}
> +
> static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
>
>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
--
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