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Message-ID: <492d0bfd.0af6660a.37d8.4b8b@mx.google.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2008 00:42:37 -0800 (PST)
From: eranian@...glemail.com
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, mingo@...e.hu, x86@...nel.org,
andi@...stfloor.org, eranian@...il.com, sfr@...b.auug.org.au
Subject: [patch 15/24] perfmon: context creation
This patch adds perfmon context management functions to create
and destroy a perfmon context which encapsulates the entire PMU
state.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@...il.com>
--
Index: o3/perfmon/perfmon_ctx.c
===================================================================
--- o3.orig/perfmon/perfmon_ctx.c 2008-11-25 18:56:15.000000000 +0100
+++ o3/perfmon/perfmon_ctx.c 2008-11-25 19:00:38.000000000 +0100
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/perfmon_kern.h>
#include "perfmon_priv.h"
@@ -162,3 +163,238 @@
}
return 0;
}
+
+/**
+ * pfm_ctx_permissions - check authorization to create new context
+ * @ctx_flags: context flags passed by user
+ *
+ * check for permissions to create a context.
+ *
+ * A sysadmin may decide to restrict creation of per-thread
+ * context to a group of users using the group id via
+ * /sys/kernel/perfmon/task_group
+ *
+ * Once we identify a user level package which can be used
+ * to grant/revoke Linux capabilites at login via PAM, we will
+ * be able to use capabilities. We would also need to increase
+ * the size of cap_t to support more than 32 capabilities (it
+ * is currently defined as u32 and 32 capabilities are alrady
+ * defined).
+ */
+static inline int pfm_ctx_permissions(u32 ctx_flags)
+{
+ if (pfm_controls.task_group != PFM_GROUP_PERM_ANY
+ && !in_group_p(pfm_controls.task_group)) {
+ PFM_DBG("user group not allowed to create a task context");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pfm_create_initial_set - create initial set from __pfm_c reate_context
+ * @ctx: context to atatched the set to
+ */
+static void pfm_create_initial_set(struct pfm_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct pfm_event_set *set;
+ u64 *impl_pmcs;
+ u16 i, max_pmc;
+
+ set = ctx->active_set;
+ max_pmc = ctx->regs.max_pmc;
+ impl_pmcs = ctx->regs.pmcs;
+
+ /*
+ * install default values for all PMC registers
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < max_pmc; i++) {
+ if (pfm_arch_bv_test_bit(i, impl_pmcs)) {
+ set->pmcs[i] = pfm_pmu_conf->pmc_desc[i].dfl_val;
+ PFM_DBG("pmc%u=0x%llx",
+ i,
+ (unsigned long long)set->pmcs[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * PMD registers are set to 0 when the event set is allocated,
+ * hence we do not need to explicitly initialize them.
+ *
+ * For virtual PMD registers (i.e., those tied to a SW resource)
+ * their value becomes meaningful once the context is attached.
+ */
+}
+
+/**
+ * __pfm_create_context - allocate and initialize a perfmon context
+ * @ctx_flags : user context flags
+ * @sif: pointer to pfarg_sinfo to be updated
+ * @new_ctx: will contain new context address on return
+ *
+ * function used to allocate a new context. A context is allocated along
+ * with the default event set. If a sampling format is used, the buffer
+ * may be allocated and initialized.
+ *
+ * The file descriptor identifying the context is allocated and returned
+ * to caller.
+ *
+ * This function operates with no locks and interrupts are enabled.
+ * return:
+ * >=0: the file descriptor to identify the context
+ * <0 : the error code
+ */
+int __pfm_create_context(__u32 ctx_flags,
+ struct pfarg_sinfo *sif,
+ struct pfm_context **new_ctx)
+{
+ struct pfm_context *ctx;
+ struct file *filp = NULL;
+ int fd = 0, ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!pfm_pmu_conf)
+ return -ENOSYS;
+
+ /* no context flags supported yet */
+ if (ctx_flags)
+ goto error_alloc;
+
+ ret = pfm_ctx_permissions(ctx_flags);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_alloc;
+
+ /*
+ * we can use GFP_KERNEL and potentially sleep because we do
+ * not hold any lock at this point.
+ */
+ might_sleep();
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc(pfm_ctx_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_alloc;
+
+ PFM_DBG("alloc ctx @0x%p", ctx);
+
+ ctx->active_set = &ctx->_set0;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * context is unloaded
+ */
+ ctx->state = PFM_CTX_UNLOADED;
+
+
+ ret = pfm_pmu_acquire(ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_file;
+ /*
+ * check if PMU is usable
+ */
+ if (!(ctx->regs.num_pmcs && ctx->regs.num_pmcs)) {
+ PFM_DBG("no usable PMU registers");
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto error_file;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENFILE;
+ fd = pfm_alloc_fd(&filp);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ goto error_file;
+
+ /*
+ * initialize arch-specific section
+ * must be done before fmt_init()
+ */
+ ret = pfm_arch_context_create(ctx, ctx_flags);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_set;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * add initial set
+ */
+ pfm_create_initial_set(ctx);
+
+ filp->private_data = ctx;
+
+ ctx->last_act = PFM_INVALID_ACTIVATION;
+ ctx->last_cpu = -1;
+
+ PFM_DBG("flags=0x%x fd=%d", ctx_flags, fd);
+
+ if (new_ctx)
+ *new_ctx = ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * copy bitmask of available PMU registers
+ *
+ * must copy over the entire vector to avoid
+ * returning bogus upper bits pass by user
+ */
+ pfm_arch_bv_copy(sif->sif_avail_pmcs,
+ ctx->regs.pmcs,
+ PFM_MAX_PMCS);
+
+ pfm_arch_bv_copy(sif->sif_avail_pmds,
+ ctx->regs.pmds,
+ PFM_MAX_PMDS);
+
+ /*
+ * we defer the fd_install until we are certain the call succeeded
+ * to ensure we do not have to undo its effect. Neither put_filp()
+ * nor put_unused_fd() undoes the effect of fd_install().
+ */
+ fd_install(fd, filp);
+
+ return fd;
+
+error_set:
+ put_filp(filp);
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+error_file:
+ /*
+ * calls the right *_put() functions
+ * calls pfm_release_pmu()
+ */
+ pfm_free_context(ctx);
+ return ret;
+error_alloc:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pfm_undo_create -- undo context creation
+ * @fd: file descriptor to close
+ * @ctx: newly created context
+ *
+ * upon return neither fd nor ctx are useable
+ */
+void pfm_undo_create(int fd, struct pfm_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct files_struct *files = current->files;
+ struct file *file;
+ int fput_needed;
+
+ file = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
+ /*
+ * there is no fd_uninstall(), so we do it
+ * here. put_unused_fd() does not remove the
+ * effect of fd_install().
+ */
+
+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ files->fd_array[fd] = NULL;
+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+
+ fput_light(file, fput_needed);
+
+ /*
+ * decrement ref count and kill file
+ */
+ put_filp(file);
+
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+
+ pfm_free_context(ctx);
+}
Index: o3/perfmon/perfmon_priv.h
===================================================================
--- o3.orig/perfmon/perfmon_priv.h 2008-11-25 19:00:11.000000000 +0100
+++ o3/perfmon/perfmon_priv.h 2008-11-25 19:00:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -55,7 +55,10 @@
int pfm_init_sysfs(void);
+int __pfm_create_context(__u32 ctx_flags, struct pfarg_sinfo *sif,
+ struct pfm_context **new_ctx);
void pfm_free_context(struct pfm_context *ctx);
+void pfm_undo_create(int fd, struct pfm_context *ctx);
int __pfm_stop(struct pfm_context *ctx);
int __pfm_start(struct pfm_context *ctx);
@@ -63,6 +66,8 @@
int __pfm_load_context(struct pfm_context *ctx, struct task_struct *task);
int __pfm_unload_context(struct pfm_context *ctx);
+int pfm_alloc_fd(struct file **cfile);
+
ssize_t pfm_sysfs_res_show(char *buf, size_t sz, int what);
int pfm_pmu_acquire(struct pfm_context *ctx);
Index: o3/perfmon/perfmon_file.c
===================================================================
--- o3.orig/perfmon/perfmon_file.c 2008-11-25 18:56:15.000000000 +0100
+++ o3/perfmon/perfmon_file.c 2008-11-25 19:00:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/vfs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -92,3 +93,214 @@
}
return err;
}
+
+/*
+ * called either on explicit close() or from exit_files().
+ * Only the LAST user of the file gets to this point, i.e., it is
+ * called only ONCE.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: we get called ONLY when the refcnt on the file gets to zero
+ * (fput()),i.e, last task to access the file. Nobody else can access the
+ * file at this point.
+ *
+ * When called from exit_files(), the VMA has been freed because exit_mm()
+ * is executed before exit_files().
+ *
+ * When called from exit_files(), the current task is not yet ZOMBIE but we
+ * flush the PMU state to the context.
+ */
+static int __pfm_close(struct pfm_context *ctx, struct file *filp)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int state;
+ int can_free = 1, can_unload = 1;
+ int can_release = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
+
+ state = ctx->state;
+
+ PFM_DBG("state=%d", state);
+
+ /*
+ * check if unload is needed
+ */
+ if (state == PFM_CTX_UNLOADED)
+ goto doit;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ if (ctx->task != current) {
+ /*
+ * switch context to zombie state
+ */
+ ctx->state = PFM_CTX_ZOMBIE;
+
+ PFM_DBG("zombie ctx for [%d]", ctx->task->pid);
+ /*
+ * PMU session will be released by monitored task when
+ * it notices ZOMBIE state as part of pfm_unload_context()
+ */
+ can_unload = can_free = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (can_unload)
+ can_release = !__pfm_unload_context(ctx);
+doit:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
+
+ if (can_release)
+ pfm_session_release();
+
+ if (can_free)
+ pfm_free_context(ctx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * called either on explicit close() or from exit_files().
+ * Only the LAST user of the file gets to this point, i.e., it is
+ * called only ONCE.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: we get called ONLY when the refcnt on the file gets to zero
+ * (fput()),i.e, last task to access the file. Nobody else can access the
+ * file at this point.
+ *
+ * When called from exit_files(), the VMA has been freed because exit_mm()
+ * is executed before exit_files().
+ *
+ * When called from exit_files(), the current task is not yet ZOMBIE but we
+ * flush the PMU state to the context.
+ */
+static int pfm_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct pfm_context *ctx;
+
+ PFM_DBG("called filp=%p", filp);
+
+ ctx = filp->private_data;
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ PFM_ERR("no ctx");
+ return -EBADF;
+ }
+ return __pfm_close(ctx, filp);
+}
+
+static int pfm_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare)
+{
+ PFM_DBG("pfm_file_ops");
+
+ return -ENXIO;
+}
+
+static unsigned int pfm_no_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t pfm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t size,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ PFM_DBG("pfm_read called");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static ssize_t pfm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ PFM_DBG("pfm_write called");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int pfm_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ PFM_DBG("pfm_ioctl called");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+const struct file_operations pfm_file_ops = {
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .read = pfm_read,
+ .write = pfm_write,
+ .ioctl = pfm_ioctl,
+ .open = pfm_no_open, /* special open to disallow open via /proc */
+ .release = pfm_close,
+ .poll = pfm_no_poll,
+};
+
+static int pfmfs_delete_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static struct dentry_operations pfmfs_dentry_operations = {
+ .d_delete = pfmfs_delete_dentry,
+};
+
+int pfm_alloc_fd(struct file **cfile)
+{
+ int fd, ret = 0;
+ struct file *file = NULL;
+ struct inode * inode;
+ char name[32];
+ struct qstr this;
+
+ fd = get_unused_fd();
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -ENFILE;
+
+ ret = -ENFILE;
+
+ file = get_empty_filp();
+ if (!file)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * allocate a new inode
+ */
+ inode = new_inode(pfmfs_mnt->mnt_sb);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+
+ PFM_DBG("new inode ino=%ld @%p", inode->i_ino, inode);
+
+ inode->i_sb = pfmfs_mnt->mnt_sb;
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR|S_IRUGO;
+ inode->i_uid = current->fsuid;
+ inode->i_gid = current->fsgid;
+
+ sprintf(name, "[%lu]", inode->i_ino);
+ this.name = name;
+ this.hash = inode->i_ino;
+ this.len = strlen(name);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * allocate a new dcache entry
+ */
+ file->f_dentry = d_alloc(pfmfs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_root, &this);
+ if (!file->f_dentry)
+ goto out;
+
+ file->f_dentry->d_op = &pfmfs_dentry_operations;
+
+ d_add(file->f_dentry, inode);
+ file->f_vfsmnt = mntget(pfmfs_mnt);
+ file->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
+
+ file->f_op = &pfm_file_ops;
+ file->f_mode = FMODE_READ;
+ file->f_flags = O_RDONLY;
+ file->f_pos = 0;
+
+ *cfile = file;
+
+ return fd;
+out:
+ if (file)
+ put_filp(file);
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+ return ret;
+}
Index: o3/include/linux/perfmon.h
===================================================================
--- o3.orig/include/linux/perfmon.h 2008-11-25 18:58:39.000000000 +0100
+++ o3/include/linux/perfmon.h 2008-11-25 19:00:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -46,6 +46,16 @@
#define PFM_PMC_BV PFM_BVSIZE(PFM_MAX_PMCS)
/*
+ * argument to pfm_create
+ * populated on return
+ */
+struct pfarg_sinfo {
+ __u64 sif_avail_pmcs[PFM_PMC_BV];/* out: available PMCs */
+ __u64 sif_avail_pmds[PFM_PMD_BV];/* out: available PMDs */
+ __u64 sif_reserved1[4]; /* for future use */
+};
+
+/*
* PMC and PMD generic register description
*/
struct pfarg_pmr {
--
--
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