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Message-ID: <20081202181333.38c7b421@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2008 18:13:33 +0000
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...hat.com>
Cc: Izik Eidus <ieidus@...hat.com>, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, aarcange@...hat.com, chrisw@...hat.com,
avi@...hat.com, dlaor@...hat.com, kamezawa.hiroyu@...fujitsu.com,
cl@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] add ksm kernel shared memory driver.
On Tue, 2 Dec 2008 10:07:24 -0800
Chris Wright <chrisw@...hat.com> wrote:
> * Alan Cox (alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk) wrote:
> > > + r = !memcmp(old_digest, sha1_item->sha1val, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > > + mutex_unlock(&sha1_lock);
> > > + if (r) {
> > > + char *old_addr, *new_addr;
> > > + old_addr = kmap_atomic(oldpage, KM_USER0);
> > > + new_addr = kmap_atomic(newpage, KM_USER1);
> > > + r = !memcmp(old_addr+PAGEHASH_LEN, new_addr+PAGEHASH_LEN,
> > > + PAGE_SIZE-PAGEHASH_LEN);
> >
> > NAK - this isn't guaranteed to be robust so you could end up merging
> > different pages one provided by a malicious attacker.
>
> I presume you're referring to the digest comparison. While there's
> theoretical concern of hash collision, it's mitigated by hmac(sha1)
> so the attacker can't brute force for known collisions.
Using current known techniques. A random collision is just as bad news.
This code simply isn't fit for the kernel.
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