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Message-ID: <20081203102925.1aa97d14@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2008 10:29:25 +0000
From: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Geoffrey McRae <geoff@...idhost.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: New Security Features, Please Comment
> The idea is to not allow the child to change its own uid, or give the
> child any elevated privlages so that should the child be compromised via
> buffer overflow or some other bug, it cant be abused.
But the child process can modify itself, it can open files etc.
So as uid 1 I patch my own code to add a function call to a private
function that will be called regularly. Now as the other uids are
selected I am able to attack all those users file stores.
I don't think your model actually works.
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