[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20081203191733.GA16652@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2008 13:17:33 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Dhaval Giani <dhaval@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for
CLONE_NEWUSER
While ideally CLONE_NEWUSER will eventually require no
privilege, the required permission checks are currently
not there. As a result, CLONE_NEWUSER has the same effect
as a setuid(0)+setgroups(1,"0"). While we already require
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, requiring CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID seems
appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
---
kernel/fork.c | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 1dd8945..e3a85b3 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1344,7 +1344,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
/* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is
* complete
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
+ !capable(CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
}
--
1.5.4.3
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists