linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/4] add ksm kernel shared memory driver.

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Date:	Wed, 3 Dec 2008 15:33:08 +0100
From:	Pavel Machek <pavel@...e.cz>
To:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:	Chris Wright <chrisw@...hat.com>, Izik Eidus <ieidus@...hat.com>,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, aarcange@...hat.com,
	avi@...hat.com, dlaor@...hat.com, kamezawa.hiroyu@...fujitsu.com,
	cl@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] add ksm kernel shared memory driver.

On Tue 2008-12-02 22:10:29, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Tue, 2 Dec 2008 13:24:11 -0800
> Chris Wright <chrisw@...hat.com> wrote:
> 
> > * Alan Cox (alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk) wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2 Dec 2008 10:07:24 -0800
> > > Chris Wright <chrisw@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > > * Alan Cox (alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk) wrote:
> > > > > > +	r = !memcmp(old_digest, sha1_item->sha1val, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > > > > > +	mutex_unlock(&sha1_lock);
> > > > > > +	if (r) {
> > > > > > +		char *old_addr, *new_addr;
> > > > > > +		old_addr = kmap_atomic(oldpage, KM_USER0);
> > > > > > +		new_addr = kmap_atomic(newpage, KM_USER1);
> > > > > > +		r = !memcmp(old_addr+PAGEHASH_LEN, new_addr+PAGEHASH_LEN,
> > > > > > +			    PAGE_SIZE-PAGEHASH_LEN);
> > > > > 
> > > > > NAK - this isn't guaranteed to be robust so you could end up merging
> > > > > different pages one provided by a malicious attacker.
> > > > 
> > > > I presume you're referring to the digest comparison.  While there's
> > > > theoretical concern of hash collision, it's mitigated by hmac(sha1)
> > > > so the attacker can't brute force for known collisions.
> > > 
> > > Using current known techniques. A random collision is just as bad news.
> > 
> > And, just to clarify, your concern would extend to any digest based
> > comparison?  Or are you specifically concerned about sha1?
> 
> Taken off list 

Hmmm, list would like to know :-).

-- 
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