[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20081216233128.GA13942@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2008 10:31:28 +1100
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
To: Huang Ying <ying.huang@...el.com>
Cc: "Siddha, Suresh B" <suresh.b.siddha@...el.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <linux-crypto@...breakpoint.cc>,
"akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"mingo@...e.hu" <mingo@...e.hu>,
"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH crypto] AES: Add support to Intel AES-NI
instructions
On Mon, Dec 15, 2008 at 11:38:01PM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 15, 2008 at 04:21:06PM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> >
> > > a. Do not touch SSE state in soft_irq
> > > b. Disable/restore soft_irq in kernel_fpu_begin/kernel_fpu_end
> > > c. Use a per-CPU data structure to save kernel FPU state during
> > > soft_irq.
> Here's another option
>
> d. When we're in interrupt context, schedule a task to perform
> the encryption asynchronously.
We can also hybridise b. and d.:
e. When we're in interrupt context, if TS is clear, then we defer
the operation to a thread. Otherwise if user-space has touched
the FPU we save the state, if not then we simply clear TS. In
either case we perform the operation immediately and then reset
TS if user-space didn't touch the FPU.
This is based on the fact that it should be fairly rare for us
to interrupt a kernel FPU/SSE operation. The common case would
be interrupting a user process or a kernel context which is not
engaging in any kernel FPU operations.
Cheers,
--
Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/
Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists