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Message-Id: <1235452285.26788.226.camel@nimitz>
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 21:11:25 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Nathan Lynch <nathanl@...tin.ibm.com>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
mpm@...enic.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, hpa@...or.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, tglx@...utronix.de, xemul@...nvz.org
Subject: Re: Banning checkpoint (was: Re: What can OpenVZ do?)
On Tue, 2009-02-24 at 07:47 +0300, Alexey Dobriyan wrote:
> > I think what I posted is a decent compromise. It gets you those
> > warnings at runtime and is a one-way trip for any given process. But,
> > it does detect in certain cases (fork() and unshare(FILES)) when it is
> > safe to make the trip back to the "I'm checkpointable" state again.
>
> "Checkpointable" is not even per-process property.
>
> Imagine, set of SAs (struct xfrm_state) and SPDs (struct xfrm_policy).
> They are a) per-netns, b) persistent.
>
> You can hook into socketcalls to mark process as uncheckpointable,
> but since SAs and SPDs are persistent, original process already exited.
> You're going to walk every process with same netns as SA adder and mark
> it as uncheckpointable. Definitely doable, but ugly, isn't it?
>
> Same for iptable rules.
>
> "Checkpointable" is container property, OK?
Ideally, I completely agree.
But, we don't currently have a concept of a true container in the
kernel. Do you have any suggestions for any current objects that we
could use in its place for a while?
-- Dave
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