linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] x86: clean up use of system_state in virt_addr

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Message-ID: <49B058F0.3010405@goop.org>
Date:	Thu, 05 Mar 2009 14:57:52 -0800
From:	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>
To:	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...il.com>
CC:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86: clean up use of system_state in virt_addr_valid
 and co

Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 5.3.2009 03:15, Jeremy Fitzhardinge wrote:
>> x86-32: use specific __vmalloc_start_set flag in __virt_addr_valid
>> x86-64: pre-initialize boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to avoid system_state
>> tests
>
> Looks good, thanks. Just an idea, wouldn't make sense to add the check 
> directly into is_vmalloc_addr?

I thought about it, but I think its simply invalid to call 
is_vmalloc_addr() until you can meaningfully have vmalloc addresses.  It 
would be nice to have some way to warn about callers who are using these 
predicates in a meaningless way, but there doesn't appear to be any 
sensible way to do so (I guess the case I'm concerned about is people 
using VMALLOC_START for something before it is meaningful).

    J
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