2.6.28-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
commit 76a67ec6fb79ff3570dcb5342142c16098299911 upstream.
Since creating a device node is normally an operation requiring special
privilege, Igor Zhbanov points out that it is surprising (to say the
least) that a client can, for example, create a device node on a
filesystem exported with root_squash.
So, make sure CAP_MKNOD is among the capabilities dropped when an nfsd
thread handles a request from a non-root user.
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <izh1979@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -382,8 +382,10 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
- CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \
+ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \
+ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
--
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