linux-kernel - [PATCH] add some long-missing capabilities to fs

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Message-ID: <20090323224621.GA22552@us.ibm.com>
Date:	Mon, 23 Mar 2009 17:46:21 -0500
From:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	mtk.manpages@...il.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ch.ncsc.mil>,
	Andrew Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
	Igor Zhbanov <izh1979@...il.com>,
	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...i.umich.edu>, stable@...nel.org,
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Subject: [PATCH] add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask

(Sorry, the version I sent Friday had a duplicate CAP_FS_SET define)

When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux
cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having
fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.  However, before capabilities the privilege
to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.

This patch introduces those capabilities into the fsmask,
restoring the old behavior.

See the thread starting at http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/3/11/157 for
reference.

Note that if this fix is deemed valid, then earlier kernel versions (2.4
and 2.2) ought to be fixed too.

Changelog:
	[Mar 23] Actually delete old CAP_FS_SET definition...
	[Mar 20] Updated against J. Bruce Fields's patch

Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <izh1979@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: stable@...nel.org
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@...i.umich.edu>
---
 include/linux/capability.h |   23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 4864a43..c302110 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -377,7 +377,21 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
 	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
 
+/*
+ * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
+ *
+ * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
+ * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
+ *
+ * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
+ *
+ * We could also define fsmask as follows:
+ *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
+ *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
+ */
+
 # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
+			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
@@ -392,11 +406,12 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 # define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
 # define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
 # define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
-# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
+				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
 # define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
-					    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \
-					    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \
-					    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
+				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
 
 #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
 
-- 
1.5.4.3

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