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Message-ID: <alpine.LSU.0.999.0903271354290.5610@be1.lrz>
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 14:04:32 +0100 (CET)
From: Bodo Eggert <7eggert@....de>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
cc: Bodo Eggert <7eggert@....de>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: TOMOYO in linux-next
On Fri, 27 Mar 2009, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Fri 2009-03-27 10:28:07, Bodo Eggert wrote:
> > Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> wrote:
> > > I don't think merging that is good idea. Security should be doable
> > > without making shell-like glob matching...
> >
> > How do you suppose a security system should handle mozilla modifying
> > ~/.bashrc differently from downloading something to ~/pr0n.jpg?
>
> How does shell-like glob matching help there? You'd need to parse
> /etc/passwd to find all ~ directories...
That is, if you'd use HOME=`dd if=/dev/urandom ...`.
If you have your users in /home/user, you can tell /home/*/.*
is bad, /home/*/[^.]* is OK.
How would you exclude mozilla from writing to .* then? ".a" is bad,
".b" is bad ...? or "A" is OK, "a" is OK, "zzzzzzzzzzzzz" is OK"?
Either way, you'd need several universes to store the security profile.
--
The enemy diversion you have been ignoring will be the main attack.
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