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Message-ID: <20090407052801.GA4235@elte.hu>
Date:	Tue, 7 Apr 2009 07:28:01 +0200
From:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Avan Anishchuk <matimatik@...il.com>,
	Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@...el.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Eduard - Gabriel Munteanu <eduard.munteanu@...ux360.ro>
Subject: [patch] ramfs: add support for "mode=" mount option, fix


* Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:

> On Mon, 6 Apr 2009, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > 
> > It bisected past them. I'm getting worried that it's timing-related, 
> > because nothing that remains looks even remotely interesting for that Mac 
> > mini, but right now:
> > 
> >  - bad: 56fcef75117a153f298b3fe54af31053f53997dd
> >  - good: bb233fdfc7b7cefe45bfa2e8d1b24e79c60a48e5
> > 
> > and there's not a whole lot of commits in between.
> 
> It's c3b1b1cbf002e65a3cabd479e68b5f35886a26db: 'ramfs: add support 
> for "mode=" mount option'.
> 
> And I checked. Reverting it at the tip fixes it. So no random 
> timing fluctuations.
> 
> So that commit causes some random SLAB corruption, that then 
> (depending apparently on luck) may or may not crash in some odd 
> random places later.

ah - forget my previous mail then.

This commit does have a couple of genuinely odd looking lines.

For example:

+       sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
+
+       err = ramfs_parse_options(data, &fsi->mount_opts);
+       if (err)
+               goto fail;

Say we fail in ramfs_parse_options() and do the 'fail' pattern:

+fail:
+       kfree(fsi);
+       iput(inode);
+       return err;

so we have 'fsi' kfree()'d but dont clear sb->s_fs_info! That's 
almost always a bad practice. And indeed, in the kill_super 
callback:

+static void ramfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+       kfree(sb->s_fs_info);

What ensures that this cannot be a double kfree() memory corruption? 
That pointer should have been cleared with something like the patch 
below. (totally untested)

And there's also another, probably just theoretical worry about 
another failure path:

+       fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ramfs_fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!fsi) {
+               err = -ENOMEM;
+               goto fail;
+       }
+       sb->s_fs_info = fsi;

leaves sb->s_fs_info uninitialized in the failure case, and might 
hit this code unconditionally:

+static void ramfs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+       kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
+       kill_litter_super(sb);
+}

Leaving this code at the mercy of the external call environment 
initializing sb->s_fs_info. Which if it does not do (or stops 
doing in the future), can trigger a kfree of a random pointer.

(I think ->kill_super() gets called even if ->fill_super() fails, 
but i have not checked closely.)

These kinds of assymetric failure paths are really a red flag during 
review.

VFS infrastructure nit: we have 20 other similar looking but 
slightly differently implemented filesystem options parsers, in each 
filesystem. Might make sense to factor that out a bit and 
standardize it across all filesystems and make it all a bit safer. 
Duplicating code like that is never good IMHO.

	Ingo

diff --git a/fs/ramfs/inode.c b/fs/ramfs/inode.c
index a404fb8..3a6b193 100644
--- a/fs/ramfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ramfs/inode.c
@@ -221,22 +221,23 @@ static int ramfs_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 	save_mount_options(sb, data);
 
 	fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ramfs_fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
 	if (!fsi) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fail;
 	}
-	sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
 
 	err = ramfs_parse_options(data, &fsi->mount_opts);
 	if (err)
 		goto fail;
 
-	sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
-	sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
-	sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
-	sb->s_magic = RAMFS_MAGIC;
-	sb->s_op = &ramfs_ops;
-	sb->s_time_gran = 1;
+	sb->s_maxbytes		= MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
+	sb->s_blocksize		= PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
+	sb->s_blocksize_bits	= PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+	sb->s_magic		= RAMFS_MAGIC;
+	sb->s_op		= &ramfs_ops;
+	sb->s_time_gran		= 1;
+
 	inode = ramfs_get_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | fsi->mount_opts.mode, 0);
 	if (!inode) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -244,14 +245,16 @@ static int ramfs_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
 	}
 
 	root = d_alloc_root(inode);
+	sb->s_root = root;
 	if (!root) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fail;
 	}
-	sb->s_root = root;
+
 	return 0;
 fail:
 	kfree(fsi);
+	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
 	iput(inode);
 	return err;
 }
--
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