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Message-ID: <20090416162910.GA20736@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 11:29:10 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@...columbia.edu>,
Dave Hansen <dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, xemul@...allels.com,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, mingo@...e.hu,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, hch@...radead.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: CAP_SYS_ADMIN on restart(2)
Quoting Alexey Dobriyan (adobriyan@...il.com):
> > What Alexey wants, I believe, is for users to be able to not have
> > to worry about there being exploitable bugs in restart(2) which
> > unprivileged users can play with. And for the usual distro-kernel
> > reasons, saying use 'CONFIG_CHECKPOINT=n' is not an option.
>
> This is correct, yes. If I would be a sysadmin who knows a bit about
> kernel internals, I'd never trust restart(2) to get it right.
Now I suppose what we could do is define a new CAP_SYS_RESTART
capability and require that. Then the admin to whom I'm trying
to cater could simply 'capset cap_sys_restart=pe /bin/restart'.
Then all users could use restart without being granted the
extra privilege implied by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
-serge
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