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Message-ID: <20090423102155.18047.68135.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2009 11:21:55 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: torvalds@...l.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@...il.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] CacheFiles: Fix the documentation to use the correct
credential pointer names
From: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@...il.com>
Adjust the CacheFiles documentation to use the correct names of the credential
pointers in task_struct.
The documentation was using names from the old versions of the credentials
patches.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---
Documentation/filesystems/caching/cachefiles.txt | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/caching/cachefiles.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/caching/cachefiles.txt
index c78a49b..748a1ae 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/caching/cachefiles.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/caching/cachefiles.txt
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ A NOTE ON SECURITY
==================
CacheFiles makes use of the split security in the task_struct. It allocates
-its own task_security structure, and redirects current->act_as to point to it
+its own task_security structure, and redirects current->cred to point to it
when it acts on behalf of another process, in that process's context.
The reason it does this is that it calls vfs_mkdir() and suchlike rather than
@@ -429,9 +429,9 @@ This means it may lose signals or ptrace events for example, and affects what
the process looks like in /proc.
So CacheFiles makes use of a logical split in the security between the
-objective security (task->sec) and the subjective security (task->act_as). The
-objective security holds the intrinsic security properties of a process and is
-never overridden. This is what appears in /proc, and is what is used when a
+objective security (task->real_cred) and the subjective security (task->cred).
+The objective security holds the intrinsic security properties of a process and
+is never overridden. This is what appears in /proc, and is what is used when a
process is the target of an operation by some other process (SIGKILL for
example).
--
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