| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20090429141837.beaa5d59.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 14:18:37 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, hooanon05@...oo.co.jp,
jmorris@...ei.org, safford@...son.ibm.com,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
On Tue, 28 Apr 2009 14:32:14 -0400
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> The number of calls to ima_path_check()/ima_file_free()
> should be balanced. An extra call to fput(), indicates
> the file could have been accessed without first being
> measured.
>
> An nfsd exported file is opened/closed by the kernel
> causing an integrity imbalance message.
>
> - rename and export opencount_get to ima_opencount_get
> - replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_opencount_get
> - add call to increment opencount for files opened by nfsd.
> - add call to measure exported files in nfsd_permission().
> - export ima_path_check
>
The patch looks fragile to me. It sprinkles IMA-specific operations
over random unrelated subsystems. There is hence a decent chance of
breakage in the future.
Suppose some other new piece of kernel code opens/closes a file. The
developer didn't think to add the IMA hooks and whoops, we have a bug.
It would be really really better if we could add the IMA hooks in a
single place. That might require the addition of a new function, and
that's fine. d_instantiate_kernel() or init_file_kernel() or whatever
- that's fine. It still has the risk that new code will forget to use
the in-kernel variant, but we have a better chance of detecting it.
>
> Index: security-testing-2.6/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> ===================================================================
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4 */
> #include <linux/jhash.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>
> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
>
> @@ -735,6 +736,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
> flags, cred);
> if (IS_ERR(*filp))
> host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
> + else
> + ima_opencount_get(*filp);
This suggests dentry_open_kernel().
> out_nfserr:
> err = nfserrno(host_err);
> out:
> @@ -2096,7 +2099,13 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
> acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE))
> err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
> + if (err)
> + goto nfsd_out;
>
> + err = ima_path_check(&exp->ex_path,
> + acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
hm, dunno what to do about that.
> + return err;
> +nfsd_out:
> return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
> }
>
> Index: security-testing-2.6/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> ===================================================================
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ out:
> kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
> return 0;
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
>
> static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> int mask, int function)
> @@ -234,7 +235,16 @@ out:
> return rc;
> }
>
> -static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
> +/*
> + * ima_opencount_get - incr opencount for files opened by the kernel
> + *
> + * - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file.
> + * - nfsd opens/closes exported files.
> + *
> + * Increment the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
> + * imbalance messages.
> + */
> +void ima_opencount_get(struct file *file)
> {
> struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
> @@ -248,6 +258,7 @@ static void opencount_get(struct file *f
> iint->opencount++;
> mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_opencount_get);
>
> /**
> * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
> @@ -272,18 +283,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, uns
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/*
> - * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
> - *
> - * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
> - * imbalance messages.
> - */
> -void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
> -{
> - opencount_get(file);
> - return;
> -}
> -
> /**
> * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
> * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
> Index: security-testing-2.6/include/linux/ima.h
> ===================================================================
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ security-testing-2.6/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode
> extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
> extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
> extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
> -extern void ima_shm_check(struct file *file);
> +extern void ima_opencount_get(struct file *file);
>
> #else
> static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct f
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
> +static inline void ima_opencount_get(struct file *file)
> {
> return;
> }
> Index: security-testing-2.6/ipc/shm.c
> ===================================================================
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/ipc/shm.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/ipc/shm.c
> @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *
> error = PTR_ERR(file);
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> goto no_file;
> - ima_shm_check(file);
> + ima_opencount_get(file);
>
> id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
> if (id < 0) {
> @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
> file = alloc_file(path.mnt, path.dentry, f_mode, &shm_file_operations);
> if (!file)
> goto out_free;
> - ima_shm_check(file);
> + ima_opencount_get(file);
>
> file->private_data = sfd;
> file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;
> Index: security-testing-2.6/mm/shmem.c
> ===================================================================
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/mm/shmem.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/mm/shmem.c
> @@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@ int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_stru
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> - ima_shm_check(file);
> + ima_opencount_get(file);
> if (vma->vm_file)
> fput(vma->vm_file);
> vma->vm_file = file;
Maybe do the IMA operations in (or under) shmem_file_setup() and
hugetlb_file_setup()?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists