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Message-ID: <20090503185549.GA17087@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 3 May 2009 20:55:49 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>, utrace-devel@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach
Remove the "Nasty, nasty" lock dance in ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme().
>From now task_lock() has nothing to do with ptrace at all.
With the recent changes nobody uses task_lock() to serialize with ptrace,
but in fact it was never needed and it was never used consistently.
However ptrace_attach() calls __ptrace_may_access() and needs task_lock()
to pin task->mm for get_dumpable(). But we can call __ptrace_may_access()
before we take tasklist_lock, ->cred_exec_mutex protects us against
do_execve() path which can change creds and MMF_DUMP* flags.
(ugly, but we can't use ptrace_may_access() because it hides the error
code, so we have to take task_lock() and use __ptrace_may_access()).
Also, kill "if (!task->mm)" check. It buys nothing, we can attach to the
task right before it does exit_mm(). Instead, add PF_KTHREAD check to
prevent attaching to the kernel thread with a borrowed ->mm.
What we need is to make sure we can't attach after exit_notify(), check
task->exit_state.
And finally, move ptrace_traceme() up near ptrace_attach() to keep them
close to each other.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
--- PTRACE/kernel/ptrace.c~2_ATTACH 2009-05-03 19:30:15.000000000 +0200
+++ PTRACE/kernel/ptrace.c 2009-05-03 19:57:11.000000000 +0200
@@ -177,66 +177,79 @@ bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struc
int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
{
int retval;
- unsigned long flags;
audit_ptrace(task);
retval = -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+ goto out;
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
goto out;
-
- /* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
+ /*
+ * Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
* SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace.
*/
retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
- if (retval < 0)
+ if (retval < 0)
goto out;
- retval = -EPERM;
-repeat:
- /*
- * Nasty, nasty.
- *
- * We want to hold both the task-lock and the
- * tasklist_lock for writing at the same time.
- * But that's against the rules (tasklist_lock
- * is taken for reading by interrupts on other
- * cpu's that may have task_lock).
- */
task_lock(task);
- if (!write_trylock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags)) {
- task_unlock(task);
- do {
- cpu_relax();
- } while (!write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock));
- goto repeat;
- }
-
- if (!task->mm)
- goto bad;
- /* the same process cannot be attached many times */
- if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
- goto bad;
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ task_unlock(task);
if (retval)
- goto bad;
+ goto unlock_creds;
- /* Go */
- task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
+ goto unlock_tasklist;
+ if (task->ptrace)
+ goto unlock_tasklist;
+
+ task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
__ptrace_link(task, current);
send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_FORCED, task);
-bad:
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
- task_unlock(task);
+unlock_tasklist:
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
+/**
+ * ptrace_traceme -- helper for PTRACE_TRACEME
+ *
+ * Performs checks and sets PT_PTRACED.
+ * Should be used by all ptrace implementations for PTRACE_TRACEME.
+ */
+int ptrace_traceme(void)
+{
+ int ret = -EPERM;
+
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ /* Are we already being traced? */
+ if (!current->ptrace) {
+ ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
+ /*
+ * Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
+ * exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
+ * pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
+ */
+ if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+ current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
+ __ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Called with irqs disabled, returns true if childs should reap themselves.
*/
@@ -574,52 +587,6 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *c
}
/**
- * ptrace_traceme -- helper for PTRACE_TRACEME
- *
- * Performs checks and sets PT_PTRACED.
- * Should be used by all ptrace implementations for PTRACE_TRACEME.
- */
-int ptrace_traceme(void)
-{
- int ret = -EPERM;
-
- /*
- * Are we already being traced?
- */
-repeat:
- task_lock(current);
- if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) {
- /*
- * See ptrace_attach() comments about the locking here.
- */
- unsigned long flags;
- if (!write_trylock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags)) {
- task_unlock(current);
- do {
- cpu_relax();
- } while (!write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock));
- goto repeat;
- }
-
- ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
-
- /*
- * Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
- * exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
- * pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
- */
- if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
- current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
- __ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
- }
-
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
- }
- task_unlock(current);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
* ptrace_get_task_struct -- grab a task struct reference for ptrace
* @pid: process id to grab a task_struct reference of
*
--
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