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Message-ID: <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 23:29:13 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <markus@...gle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org,
linux-mips@...ux-mips.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...abs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole
* Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <markus@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 10:23, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > And I guess the seccomp interaction means that this is
> > potentially a 2.6.29 thing. Not that I know whether anybody
> > actually _uses_ seccomp. It does seem to be enabled in at least
> > Fedora kernels, but it might not be used anywhere.
>
> In the Linux version of Google Chrome, we are currently working on
> code that will use seccomp for parts of our sandboxing solution.
That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you
are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely
non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox?
Ingo
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