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Message-ID: <20090507084943.GB19133@elte.hu>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 10:49:43 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [patch] security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
* Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
>
> * Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> > On 05/07, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > >
> > > * Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > /* the callers of ptrace_may_access should be fixed */
> > > >
> > > > int ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> > >
> > > Sigh, NAK, for the reasons explained in the previous mails.
> >
> > Agreed, but what about security_operations->ptrace_may_access ?
> >
> > It has the same (bad) name, but returns the error code or 0 on
> > success.
>
> Bad code should generally be fixed, or in exceptional circumstances
> it can tolerated if it's pre-existing bad code, but it should never
> be propagated. It has not spread _that_ widely yet, and is isolated
> to the security subsystem:
>
> include/linux/security.h
> security/capability.c
> security/commoncap.c
> security/root_plug.c
> security/security.c
> security/selinux/hooks.c
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c
btw. the most logical way to fix this would be to rename it from
ptrace_may_access to ptrace_access_check. Takes 30 seconds to do -
find the (completely untested) patch for that below.
Ingo
------------------->
Subject: security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.
Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.
[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
Signed-off-by-if-you-test-it: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
---
include/linux/security.h | 14 +++++++-------
security/capability.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
security/root_plug.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
Index: tip/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/include/linux/security.h
+++ tip/include/linux/security.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
- * @ptrace_may_access:
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
* Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
* @child process.
* Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
* current process before allowing the current process to present itself
* to the @parent process for tracing.
- * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
+ * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
* checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
* @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
struct security_operations {
char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
- int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+ int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct
extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
/* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1798,10 +1798,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
}
static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
Index: tip/security/capability.c
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/security/capability.c
+++ tip/security/capability.c
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ struct security_operations default_secur
void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
{
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
Index: tip/security/commoncap.c
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/security/commoncap.c
+++ tip/security/commoncap.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
}
/**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
* another
* @child: The process to be accessed
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
* granted, -ve if denied.
*/
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
Index: tip/security/root_plug.c
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/security/root_plug.c
+++ tip/security/root_plug.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
- .ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = cap_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
Index: tip/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/security/security.c
+++ tip/security/security.c
@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_op
/* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
- return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
}
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
Index: tip/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ tip/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct
/* Hook functions begin here. */
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -5318,7 +5318,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struc
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.name = "selinux",
- .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset = selinux_capset,
Index: tip/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
===================================================================
--- tip.orig/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ tip/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char
*/
/**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
* @ctp: child task pointer
* @mode: ptrace attachment mode
*
@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char
*
* Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
*/
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
@@ -2826,7 +2826,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *s
struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.name = "smack",
- .ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
--
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