[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20090507192432.GN31071@waste.org>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 14:24:32 -0500
From: Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Jake Edge <jake@....net>, security@...nel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>, mingo@...hat.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes
On Thu, May 07, 2009 at 08:41:36PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com> wrote:
>
> > > As i mentioned it in the previous mail, i'd _really_ like to
> > > hear your thread model and attack vector description. Does this
> > > overhead justify the threat? Your change will only result in
> > > get_random_int() not being considered fast anymore.
> >
> > My threat model is that someone more clever and with a lot more
> > expertise attacking systems than either you or me will be able to
> > leverage the extreme weakness of this hash (O(1) attacks against
> > the *full* version!) into an attack that incrementally exposes the
> > hidden RNG state. I've asked a couple such people whether they
> > think that's likely, and they've said yes.
>
> My question was whether the variant laced with the cycle counter
> could be exposable.
In my world, some machines don't have TSCs, so I think this is the
wrong question to be asking.
--
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists