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Message-ID: <4A03A695.6050106@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 07 May 2009 20:27:17 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: your mail
Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
>
>
>> On Thu, 7 May 2009, Chris Wright wrote:
>>
>>
>>> * Ingo Molnar (mingo@...e.hu) wrote:
>>>
>> [Added LSM list to the CC; please do so whenever making changes in this
>> area...]
>>
>>
>>>> They have no active connection to the core kernel
>>>> ptrace_may_access() check in any case:
>>>>
>>> Not sure what you mean:
>>>
>>> ptrace_may_access
>>> __ptrace_may_access
>>> security_ptrace_may_access
>>>
>>> Looks like your patch won't compile.
>>>
>>>
>> Below is an updated version which fixes the bug, against
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
>>
>> Boot tested with SELinux.
>>
>
> thanks! Below are the two patches i wrote and tested.
>
I hate to make an assumption regarding whether or not your tests
included Smack, so I'll ask. Does tested mean with Smack?
Thank you.
> Ingo
>
> ----- Forwarded message from Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> -----
>
> Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 11:49:47 +0200
> From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
> Subject: [patch 1/2] ptrace, security: rename ptrace_may_access =>
> ptrace_access_check
> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
> Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
> linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
>
> The ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - some
> variants return a bool, while the security subsystem methods have a
> retval convention.
>
> Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor. A
> followup patch eliminates the bool usage.
>
> [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
>
> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
> LKML-Reference: <20090507084943.GB19133@...e.hu>
> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> ---
> fs/proc/array.c | 2 +-
> fs/proc/base.c | 10 +++++-----
> fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/ptrace.h | 4 ++--
> include/linux/security.h | 14 +++++++-------
> kernel/ptrace.c | 10 +++++-----
> security/capability.c | 2 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
> security/root_plug.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
> 12 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> Index: linux/fs/proc/array.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/proc/array.c
> +++ linux/fs/proc/array.c
> @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file
>
> state = *get_task_state(task);
> vsize = eip = esp = 0;
> - permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> + permitted = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> mm = get_task_mm(task);
> if (mm) {
> vsize = task_vsize(mm);
> Index: linux/fs/proc/base.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ linux/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct t
> rcu_read_lock();
> match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> - if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
> + if (match && ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct tas
> if (task->mm != mm)
> goto out;
> if (task->mm != current->mm &&
> - __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
> + __ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
> goto out;
> task_unlock(task);
> return mm;
> @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct task_st
> wchan = get_wchan(task);
>
> if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0)
> - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> + if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> return 0;
> else
> return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
> @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct
> */
> task = get_proc_task(inode);
> if (task) {
> - allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> + allowed = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> put_task_struct(task);
> }
> return allowed;
> @@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file
> if (!task)
> goto out_no_task;
>
> - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> + if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> goto out;
>
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> Index: linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> +++ linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file
> goto out;
>
> ret = -EACCES;
> - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> + if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> goto out_task;
>
> ret = -EINVAL;
> Index: linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/include/linux/ptrace.h
> +++ linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
> @@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ extern void ptrace_fork(struct task_stru
> #define PTRACE_MODE_READ 1
> #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
> /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
> -extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
> +extern int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
> /* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
> -extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
> +extern bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
>
> static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
> {
> Index: linux/include/linux/security.h
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/include/linux/security.h
> +++ linux/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
> extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> int cap, int audit);
> extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
> -extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> @@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
> * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> - * @ptrace_may_access:
> + * @ptrace_access_check:
> * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
> * @child process.
> * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
> @@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
> * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
> * current process before allowing the current process to present itself
> * to the @parent process for tracing.
> - * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
> + * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
> * checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
> * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> @@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
> struct security_operations {
> char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
>
> - int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> + int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
> int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> @@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct
> extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
>
> /* Security operations */
> -int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> @@ -1798,10 +1798,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
> +static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode)
> {
> - return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> + return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> }
>
> static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> Index: linux/kernel/ptrace.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ linux/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_stru
> return ret;
> }
>
> -int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> +int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> {
> const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
>
> @@ -162,14 +162,14 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_stru
> if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
> + return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> }
>
> -bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> +bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int err;
> task_lock(task);
> - err = __ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
> + err = __ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> task_unlock(task);
> return !err;
> }
> @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ repeat:
> /* the same process cannot be attached many times */
> if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
> goto bad;
> - retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
> + retval = __ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
> if (retval)
> goto bad;
>
> Index: linux/security/capability.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/capability.c
> +++ linux/security/capability.c
> @@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ struct security_operations default_secur
>
> void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
> {
> - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
> + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
> Index: linux/security/commoncap.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/commoncap.c
> +++ linux/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
> }
>
> /**
> - * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
> + * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
> * another
> * @child: The process to be accessed
> * @mode: The mode of attachment.
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
> * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
> * granted, -ve if denied.
> */
> -int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> +int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int ret = 0;
>
> Index: linux/security/root_plug.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/root_plug.c
> +++ linux/security/root_plug.c
> @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security
>
> static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
> /* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
> - .ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
> + .ptrace_access_check = cap_ptrace_access_check,
> .ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
> .capget = cap_capget,
> .capset = cap_capset,
> Index: linux/security/security.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/security.c
> +++ linux/security/security.c
> @@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_op
>
> /* Security operations */
>
> -int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> {
> - return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> + return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> }
>
> int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> Index: linux/security/selinux/hooks.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ linux/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct
>
> /* Hook functions begin here. */
>
> -static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
> +static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode)
> {
> int rc;
>
> - rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> + rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
> @@ -5318,7 +5318,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struc
> static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> .name = "selinux",
>
> - .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
> + .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
> .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
> .capget = selinux_capget,
> .capset = selinux_capset,
> Index: linux/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ linux/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char
> */
>
> /**
> - * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
> + * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
> * @ctp: child task pointer
> * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
> *
> @@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char
> *
> * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
> */
> -static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> +static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int rc;
>
> - rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
> + rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
> if (rc != 0)
> return rc;
>
> @@ -2826,7 +2826,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *s
> struct security_operations smack_ops = {
> .name = "smack",
>
> - .ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
> + .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
> .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
> .capget = cap_capget,
> .capset = cap_capset,
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> ----- Forwarded message from Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> -----
>
> Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 11:50:54 +0200
> From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
> Subject: [patch 2/2] ptrace: turn ptrace_access_check() into a retval
> function
> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
> Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
> linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
>
> ptrace_access_check() returns a bool, while most of the ptrace
> access check machinery works with Linux retvals (where 0 indicates
> success, negative indicates an error).
>
> So eliminate the bool and invert the usage at the call sites.
>
> ( Note: "< 0" checks are used instead of !0 checks, because that's
> the convention for retval checks and it results in similarly fast
> assembly code. )
>
> [ Impact: cleanup ]
>
> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> ---
> fs/proc/array.c | 2 +-
> fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
> fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/ptrace.h | 2 +-
> kernel/ptrace.c | 6 ++++--
> 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> Index: linux/fs/proc/array.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/proc/array.c
> +++ linux/fs/proc/array.c
> @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file
>
> state = *get_task_state(task);
> vsize = eip = esp = 0;
> - permitted = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> + permitted = !ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> mm = get_task_mm(task);
> if (mm) {
> vsize = task_vsize(mm);
> Index: linux/fs/proc/base.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ linux/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct t
> rcu_read_lock();
> match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> - if (match && ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
> + if (match && !ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct task_st
> wchan = get_wchan(task);
>
> if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0)
> - if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> + if (ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
> return 0;
> else
> return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
> @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct
> */
> task = get_proc_task(inode);
> if (task) {
> - allowed = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> + allowed = !ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
> put_task_struct(task);
> }
> return allowed;
> @@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file
> if (!task)
> goto out_no_task;
>
> - if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> + if (ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
> goto out;
>
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> Index: linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> +++ linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file
> goto out;
>
> ret = -EACCES;
> - if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
> + if (ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
> goto out_task;
>
> ret = -EINVAL;
> Index: linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/include/linux/ptrace.h
> +++ linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ extern void ptrace_fork(struct task_stru
> /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
> extern int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
> /* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
> -extern bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
> +extern int ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
>
> static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
> {
> Index: linux/kernel/ptrace.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ linux/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -165,13 +165,15 @@ int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_st
> return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> }
>
> -bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> +int ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int err;
> +
> task_lock(task);
> err = __ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> task_unlock(task);
> - return !err;
> +
> + return err;
> }
>
> int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
>
>
--
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