[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.01.0906031145460.4880@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2009 11:50:16 -0700 (PDT)
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: "Larry H." <research@...reption.com>
cc: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: Security fix for remapping of page 0 (was [PATCH] Change
ZERO_SIZE_PTR to point at unmapped space)
On Wed, 3 Jun 2009, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
> That means that you've already by-passed all the main security. It's thus
> by definition less common than attack vectors like buffer overflows that
> give you that capability in the first place.
Btw, you obviously need to then _also_ pair it with some as-yet-unknown
case of kernel bug to get to that NULL pointer (or zero-sized-alloc
pointer) problem.
You _also_ seem to be totally ignoring the fact that we already _do_
protect against NULL pointers by default.
So I really don't see why you're making a big deal of this. It's as if you
were talking about us not randomizing the address space - sure, you can
turn it off, but so what? We do it by default.
So it boils down to:
- NULL pointers already cannot be in mmap memory (unless a distro has
done something wrong - outside of the kernel)
- What's your beef? Let it go, man.
Linus
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists