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Message-Id: <1244464135.3277.13.camel@dyn9002018117.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2009 08:28:55 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@...cali.co.uk>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
David Safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] integrity: fix IMA inode leak
On Sun, 2009-06-07 at 16:09 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
> On Sun, 7 Jun 2009, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> >
> > Mandatory Access Control(MAC) modules (i.e. SELinux, smack, etc) and
> > integrity (i.e IMA) are two different aspects of security. The LSM
> > hooks, which includes security_inode_free(), are used to implement MAC,
> > not integrity.
>
> So?
>
> It's under security/integrity. And it's a level of detail that fs/inode.c
> really doesn't care about.
>
> The VFS layer cares NOT AT ALL about your "different aspects of security",
> nor should it. The fact that security people think SELinux and IMA are
> different is irrelavant - fs/inode.c just doesn't care. Why should it?
>
> Linus
Today the security calls are synomymous with MAC. If I understand
correctly, you're suggesting we need to have a single security layer,
which, depending on the hook, calls either MAC or integrity, or both.
Makes sense. Copying the LSM mailing list on this discussion.
Mimi Zohar
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