lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Fri, 12 Jun 2009 10:39:40 +0200 (CEST)
From:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:	"Zhang, Yanmin" <yanmin_zhang@...ux.intel.com>
cc:	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Darren Hart <dvhltc@...ibm.com>,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Bug: fio traps into kernel without exiting because futex has a
 deadloop

On Fri, 12 Jun 2009, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Jun 2009, Zhang, Yanmin wrote:
> > On Thu, 2009-06-11 at 13:36 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > FWIW, using a private futex on a shm section is wrong in and of itself.
> >
> > What I mean is it could be used as a DOS attack.
> 
> Right. Fix is on the way.
>  
> > Did you try my test case? Could you kill it when it runs?
> 
> No, you can not kill it. That's why it needs a proper fix. Will send
> out today.

Can you please verify the patch below ? It's against 2.6.30.

Thanks,

	tglx

-------------->
futex: Fix the write access fault problem for real
    
commit 64d1304a64 (futex: setup writeable mapping for futex ops which
modify user space data) did address only half of the problem of write
access faults.
    
The patch was made on two wrong assumptions:
    
1) access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,...) would actually check write access.
  
   On x86 it does _NOT_. It's a pure address range check.
    
2) a RW mapped region can not go away under us.
    
   That's wrong as well. Nobody can prevent another thread to call
   mprotect(PROT_READ) on that region where the futex resides. If that
   call hits between the get_user_pages_fast() verification and the
   actual write access in the atomic region we are toast again.
    
   The solution is to not rely on access_ok and get_user() for any write
   access related fault on private and shared futexes. Instead we need to
   go through get_user_pages_fast() in the fault path to avoid any of the
   above pitfalls. If get_user_pages_fast() returns -EFAULT we know that
   we can not fix it anymore and need to bail out to user space.
    
   Remove a bunch of confusing comments on this issue as well.
    
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

Index: linux-2.6-tip/kernel/futex.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6-tip.orig/kernel/futex.c
+++ linux-2.6-tip/kernel/futex.c
@@ -278,6 +278,31 @@ void put_futex_key(int fshared, union fu
 	drop_futex_key_refs(key);
 }
 
+/*
+ * get_user_writeable - get user page and verify RW access
+ * @uaddr:	pointer to faulting user space address
+ *
+ * We cannot write to the user space address and get_user just faults
+ * the page in, but does not tell us whether the mapping is writeable.
+ *
+ * We can not rely on access_ok() for private futexes as it is just a
+ * range check and we can neither rely on get_user_pages() as there
+ * might be a mprotect(PROT_READ) for that mapping after
+ * get_user_pages() and before the fault in the atomic write access.
+ */
+static int get_user_writeable(u32 __user *uaddr)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)uaddr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = get_user_pages_fast(addr, 1, 1, &page);
+	if (!ret)
+		put_page(page);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static u32 cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
 {
 	u32 curval;
@@ -739,7 +764,6 @@ retry:
 retry_private:
 	op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
 	if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
-		u32 dummy;
 
 		double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 
@@ -757,7 +781,7 @@ retry_private:
 			goto out_put_keys;
 		}
 
-		ret = get_user(dummy, uaddr2);
+		ret = get_user_writeable(uaddr2);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out_put_keys;
 
@@ -1097,7 +1121,7 @@ retry:
 handle_fault:
 	spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
 
-	ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
+	ret = get_user_writeable(uaddr);
 
 	spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
 
@@ -1552,16 +1576,9 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 
 uaddr_faulted:
-	/*
-	 * We have to r/w  *(int __user *)uaddr, and we have to modify it
-	 * atomically.  Therefore, if we continue to fault after get_user()
-	 * below, we need to handle the fault ourselves, while still holding
-	 * the mmap_sem.  This can occur if the uaddr is under contention as
-	 * we have to drop the mmap_sem in order to call get_user().
-	 */
 	queue_unlock(&q, hb);
 
-	ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
+	ret = get_user_writeable(uaddr);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_put_key;
 
@@ -1657,17 +1674,10 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 
 pi_faulted:
-	/*
-	 * We have to r/w  *(int __user *)uaddr, and we have to modify it
-	 * atomically.  Therefore, if we continue to fault after get_user()
-	 * below, we need to handle the fault ourselves, while still holding
-	 * the mmap_sem.  This can occur if the uaddr is under contention as
-	 * we have to drop the mmap_sem in order to call get_user().
-	 */
 	spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
 	put_futex_key(fshared, &key);
 
-	ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
+	ret = get_user_writeable(uaddr);
 	if (!ret)
 		goto retry;
 
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ