linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v4][PATCH 2/2] intel_txt: Intel(R) TXT and tboot kernel support

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Date:	Mon, 22 Jun 2009 11:54:35 +1000 (EST)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
cc:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@...el.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	arjan@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com, andi@...stfloor.org,
	jbeulich@...ell.com, peterm@...hat.com, gang.wei@...el.com,
	shane.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v4][PATCH 2/2] intel_txt: Intel(R) TXT and tboot kernel
 support

On Fri, 19 Jun 2009, Chris Wright wrote:

> * Pavel Machek (pavel@....cz) wrote:
> > What are non-evil uses of this code?
> 
> The most common use case I've heard requested from real live
> customers[1] is...you guessed it...trusted boot.
> 
> This is typically in the context of virtualization and data centers or
> clouds.  The concerns being addressed are:
> 
> * confidence that the hardware is running the VMM that the hardware
>   owner configured it w/, since they are on the hook for providing a
>   safe service for each VM running on that hardware
> 
> * flip side of that is an additional layer protecting against malicious
>   VM that is using some VMM hole to try and subvert the host w/ a VMM
>   of their own

Agreed.  I'd also mention (again), these slides on the topic by Joanna 
Rutkowska:

http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/misc09/trusted_computing_thoughts.pdf

Also, hardware security measures such as TXT are important in providing 
stronger mechanisms to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are 
functioning correctly.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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