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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.0906221135550.18633@tundra.namei.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2009 11:54:35 +1000 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@...el.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
arjan@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com, andi@...stfloor.org,
jbeulich@...ell.com, peterm@...hat.com, gang.wei@...el.com,
shane.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v4][PATCH 2/2] intel_txt: Intel(R) TXT and tboot kernel
support
On Fri, 19 Jun 2009, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Pavel Machek (pavel@....cz) wrote:
> > What are non-evil uses of this code?
>
> The most common use case I've heard requested from real live
> customers[1] is...you guessed it...trusted boot.
>
> This is typically in the context of virtualization and data centers or
> clouds. The concerns being addressed are:
>
> * confidence that the hardware is running the VMM that the hardware
> owner configured it w/, since they are on the hook for providing a
> safe service for each VM running on that hardware
>
> * flip side of that is an additional layer protecting against malicious
> VM that is using some VMM hole to try and subvert the host w/ a VMM
> of their own
Agreed. I'd also mention (again), these slides on the topic by Joanna
Rutkowska:
http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/misc09/trusted_computing_thoughts.pdf
Also, hardware security measures such as TXT are important in providing
stronger mechanisms to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are
functioning correctly.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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