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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.0906250018370.20443@tundra.namei.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2009 00:19:16 +1000 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
This has now been applied to
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
On Thu, 7 May 2009, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 7 May 2009, Chris Wright wrote:
>
> > * Ingo Molnar (mingo@...e.hu) wrote:
>
> [Added LSM list to the CC; please do so whenever making changes in this
> area...]
>
> > > They have no active connection to the core kernel
> > > ptrace_may_access() check in any case:
> >
> > Not sure what you mean:
> >
> > ptrace_may_access
> > __ptrace_may_access
> > security_ptrace_may_access
> >
> > Looks like your patch won't compile.
> >
>
> Below is an updated version which fixes the bug, against
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
>
> Boot tested with SELinux.
>
> commit c4c79671177dc3e8387c337f75f3c664cdf08838
> Author: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> Date: Thu May 7 19:26:19 2009 +1000
>
> security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
>
> The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
> ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
> a retval convention.
>
> Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.
>
> [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
>
> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 54ed157..0147def 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
> extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> int cap, int audit);
> extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
> -extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
> * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> - * @ptrace_may_access:
> + * @ptrace_access_check:
> * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
> * @child process.
> * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
> @@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
> * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
> * current process before allowing the current process to present itself
> * to the @parent process for tracing.
> - * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
> + * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
> * checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
> * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
> struct security_operations {
> char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
>
> - int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> + int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
> int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> @@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
> extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
>
> /* Security operations */
> -int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> @@ -1797,10 +1797,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
> +static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode)
> {
> - return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> + return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> }
>
> static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index c9cf48b..284d0ac 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
> + return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> }
>
> bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> index 21b6cea..f218dd3 100644
> --- a/security/capability.c
> +++ b/security/capability.c
> @@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
>
> void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
> {
> - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
> + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 97ac1f1..e57611a 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
> }
>
> /**
> - * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
> + * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
> * another
> * @child: The process to be accessed
> * @mode: The mode of attachment.
> @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
> * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
> * granted, -ve if denied.
> */
> -int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> +int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int ret = 0;
>
> diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
> index 40fb4f1..e8d5861 100644
> --- a/security/root_plug.c
> +++ b/security/root_plug.c
> @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>
> static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
> /* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
> - .ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
> + .ptrace_access_check = cap_ptrace_access_check,
> .ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
> .capget = cap_capget,
> .capset = cap_capset,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 206e538..a3e6918 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
>
> /* Security operations */
>
> -int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> {
> - return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> + return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> }
>
> int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 39046dd..e30c4bb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
>
> /* Hook functions begin here. */
>
> -static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
> +static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode)
> {
> int rc;
>
> - rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
> + rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
> @@ -5310,7 +5310,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> .name = "selinux",
>
> - .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
> + .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
> .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
> .capget = selinux_capget,
> .capset = selinux_capset,
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index f557767..79949f9 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
> */
>
> /**
> - * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
> + * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
> * @ctp: child task pointer
> * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
> *
> @@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
> *
> * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
> */
> -static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> +static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int rc;
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> char *sp, *tsp;
>
> - rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
> + rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
> if (rc != 0)
> return rc;
>
> @@ -3031,7 +3031,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> struct security_operations smack_ops = {
> .name = "smack",
>
> - .ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
> + .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
> .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
> .capget = cap_capget,
> .capset = cap_capset,
> --
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>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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