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Message-ID: <4A4A95D8.6020708@goop.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2009 15:46:48 -0700
From: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>
To: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@...cle.com>
CC: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com, npiggin@...e.de,
chris.mason@...cle.com, kurt.hackel@...cle.com,
dave.mccracken@...cle.com, Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>, akpm@...l.org,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>,
Balbir Singh <balbir@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
tmem-devel@....oracle.com, sunil.mushran@...cle.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Himanshu Raj <rhim@...rosoft.com>,
Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@...citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux
On 06/30/09 14:21, Dan Magenheimer wrote:
> No, the uuid can't be verified. Tmem gives no indication
> as to whether a newly-created pool is already in use (shared)
> by another guest. So without both the 128-bit uuid and an
> already-in-use 64-bit object id and 32-bit page index, no data
> is readable or writable by the attacker.
>
You have to consider things like timing attacks as well (for example, a
tmem hypercall might return faster if the uuid already exists).
Besides, you can tell whether a uuid exists, by at least a couple of
mechanisms (from a quick read of the source, so I might have overlooked
something):
1. You can create new shared pools until it starts failing as a
result of hitting the MAX_GLOBAL_SHARED_POOLS limit with junk
uuids. If you then successfully "create" a shared pool while
searching, you know it already existed.
2. The returned pool id will increase unless the pool already exists,
in which case you'll get a smaller id back (ignoring wraparound).
> Hmmm... that is definitely a thornier problem. I guess the
> security angle definitely deserves more design. But, again,
> this affects only shared precache which is not intended
> to part of the proposed initial tmem patchset, so this is a futures
> issue.)
Yeah, a shared namespace of accessible objects is an entirely new thing
in the Xen universe. I would also drop Xen support until there's a good
security story about how they can be used.
J
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