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Message-ID: <20090702063813.GA18157@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2009 08:38:13 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@...cle.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com,
npiggin@...e.de, chris.mason@...cle.com, kurt.hackel@...cle.com,
dave.mccracken@...cle.com, Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>, akpm@...l.org,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>,
Balbir Singh <balbir@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
tmem-devel@....oracle.com, sunil.mushran@...cle.com,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Himanshu Raj <rhim@...rosoft.com>,
Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@...citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux
> > Yeah, a shared namespace of accessible objects is an entirely
> > new thing
> > in the Xen universe. I would also drop Xen support until
> > there's a good
> > security story about how they can be used.
>
> While I agree that the security is not bulletproof, I wonder
> if this position might be a bit extreme. Certainly, the NSA
> should not turn on tmem in a cluster, but that doesn't mean that
> nobody should be allowed to. I really suspect that there are
This has more problems than "just" security, and yes, security should
be really solved at design time...
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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