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Message-Id: <1246512767-2999-3-git-send-email-justinmattock@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2009 22:32:41 -0700
From: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@...il.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
"Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/8] SELinux hooks.c non-trivial-fixes.
Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@...il.com>
Fix some typo's.
Change some comments to look proper.
Fix some KERN_DEBUG messages to look proper.
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 265 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 15c2a08..abd707a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
-#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
-#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/ip.h> /* For local_port_range[]. */
+#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb. */
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@
#include <asm/atomic.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
-#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
+#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* For network interface checks. */
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/dccp.h>
#include <linux/quota.h>
-#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
-#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/un.h> /* For Unix socket types. */
+#include <net/af_unix.h> /* For Unix socket types. */
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
-/* SECMARK reference count */
+/* SECMARK reference count. */
atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
/**
- * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
+ * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled.
*
* Description:
* This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
}
/*
- * get the security ID of a set of credentials
+ * Get the security ID of a set of credentials.
*/
static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
{
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
}
/*
- * get the objective security ID of a task
+ * Get the objective security ID of a task.
*/
static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
{
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
}
/*
- * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ * Get the subjective security ID of the current task.
*/
static inline u32 current_sid(void)
{
@@ -206,7 +206,6 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
}
/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
-
static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
@@ -328,7 +327,7 @@ static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
extern int ss_initialized;
-/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
+/* The filesystem's label must be initialized prior to use. */
static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
"uses xattr",
@@ -414,7 +413,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
- "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ "xattr support.\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
@@ -422,7 +421,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
- "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+ "%s) Has no security xattr handler.\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
@@ -435,10 +434,10 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
@@ -501,13 +500,13 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
return -EINVAL;
tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
- /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
+ /* Count the number of mount options for this sb. */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (tmp & 0x01)
opts->num_mnt_opts++;
tmp >>= 1;
}
- /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+ /* Check if the Label support flag is set. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
opts->num_mnt_opts++;
@@ -574,14 +573,14 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
{
char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
- /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
+ /* Check if the old mount command had the same options. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
(old_sid != new_sid))
return 1;
- /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
- * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
+ /* Check if we were passed the same options twice,
+ * aka someone passed context=a,context=b.
*/
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
if (mnt_flags & flag)
@@ -623,13 +622,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
- "before the security server is initialized\n");
+ "before the security server is initialized.\n");
goto out;
}
/*
* Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
- * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
+ * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the VFS.
* Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
* we need to skip the double mount verification.
*
@@ -643,8 +642,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
goto out;
/*
- * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
- * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
+ * Parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
+ * Also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
* than once with different security options.
*/
for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
@@ -656,7 +655,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ "(%s) Failed for: (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
goto out;
}
@@ -706,7 +705,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
- /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
+ /* Previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
goto out_double_mount;
rc = 0;
@@ -724,7 +723,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
goto out;
}
- /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+ /* Sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
if (fscontext_sid) {
rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
if (rc)
@@ -735,7 +734,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/*
* Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
- * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+ * Sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
* the superblock context if not already set.
*/
if (context_sid) {
@@ -771,8 +770,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (defcontext_sid) {
if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
- "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext Option is "
+ "invalid for this filesystem type.\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -792,7 +791,7 @@ out:
return rc;
out_double_mount:
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
"security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
goto out;
}
@@ -808,7 +807,7 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
/*
- * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+ * If the parent was able to be mounted, and clearly had no special lsm
* mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
* with it later
*/
@@ -820,10 +819,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
return;
}
- /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
+ /* How can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
- /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
+ /* If fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
return;
@@ -936,7 +935,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unknown mount option.\n");
goto out_err;
}
@@ -981,7 +980,7 @@ out_err:
return rc;
}
/*
- * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
+ * String mount options parsing and call set the sbsec.
*/
static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
@@ -1042,7 +1041,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
default:
BUG();
};
- /* we need a comma before each option */
+ /* We need a comma before each option. */
seq_putc(m, ',');
seq_puts(m, prefix);
if (has_comma)
@@ -1060,7 +1059,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
if (rc) {
- /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
+ /* Before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything. */
if (rc == -EINVAL)
rc = 0;
return rc;
@@ -1263,7 +1262,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
}
if (!dentry) {
/*
- * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * This is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
* before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
* may find inodes that have no dentry on the
* sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
@@ -1314,7 +1313,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
kfree(context);
goto out_unlock;
}
- /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
+ /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID. */
sid = sbsec->def_sid;
rc = 0;
} else {
@@ -1404,11 +1403,11 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
break;
case SIGKILL:
- /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+ /* Cannot be caught or ignored. */
perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
break;
case SIGSTOP:
- /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+ /* Cannot be caught or ignored. */
perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
break;
default:
@@ -1437,7 +1436,7 @@ static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
* Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
* fork check, ptrace check, etc.
* tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
- * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
+ * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1.
*/
static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
const struct task_struct *tsk2,
@@ -1457,7 +1456,7 @@ static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
* Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
* fork check, ptrace check, etc.
* current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
- * - this uses current's subjective creds
+ * - this uses current's subjective creds.
*/
static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
u32 perms)
@@ -1498,7 +1497,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR
- "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+ "SELinux: Out of range capability. %d\n", cap);
BUG();
}
@@ -1657,7 +1656,7 @@ static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
#define MAY_UNLINK 1
#define MAY_RMDIR 2
-/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir of a file/directory. */
static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
int kind)
@@ -1692,7 +1691,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
av = DIR__RMDIR;
break;
default:
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: Unrecognized kind. %d\n",
__func__, kind);
return 0;
}
@@ -1853,7 +1852,6 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
}
/* Hook functions begin here. */
-
static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
@@ -1919,7 +1917,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
* need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
* the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
*/
-
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
@@ -2030,7 +2027,7 @@ static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
break;
default:
- rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+ rc = 0; /* Let the kernel handle invalid cmds. */
break;
}
return rc;
@@ -2052,20 +2049,20 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
return rc;
switch (type) {
- case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
- case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
+ case 3: /* Read last kernel messages. */
+ case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer. */
rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
break;
- case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
- case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
- case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
+ case 6: /* Disable logging to console. */
+ case 7: /* Enable logging to console. */
+ case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console. */
rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
break;
- case 0: /* Close log */
- case 1: /* Open log */
- case 2: /* Read from log */
- case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
- case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
+ case 0: /* Close log. */
+ case 1: /* Open log. */
+ case 2: /* Read from log. */
+ case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages. */
+ case 5: /* Clear ring buffer. */
default:
rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
break;
@@ -2093,7 +2090,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
-/* binprm security operations */
+/* binprm security operations. */
static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
@@ -2109,7 +2106,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return rc;
/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
- * the script interpreter */
+ * the script interpreter. */
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
@@ -2161,7 +2158,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (rc)
return rc;
- /* Check for shared state */
+ /* Check for shared state. */
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
@@ -2171,7 +2168,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
- * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
+ * changes its SID has the appropriate permit. */
if (bprm->unsafe &
(LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
struct task_struct *tracer;
@@ -2323,7 +2320,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
}
/*
- * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
+ * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec.
*/
static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
@@ -2345,7 +2342,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
* task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
*
- * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
+ * Note: That the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
* controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
* soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
* higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
@@ -2365,7 +2362,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/*
* Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
- * due to exec
+ * due to exec.
*/
static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
@@ -2408,8 +2405,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
-/* superblock security operations */
-
+/* Superblock security operations. */
static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
@@ -2521,7 +2517,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
if (rc)
return rc;
- /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
+ /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel. */
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
return 0;
@@ -2564,8 +2560,7 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
}
-/* inode security operations */
-
+/* Inode security operations. */
static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
return inode_alloc_security(inode);
@@ -2600,7 +2595,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
&newsid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
- "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
+ "security_transition_sid Failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
"ino=%ld)\n",
__func__,
-rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
@@ -2819,8 +2814,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
- "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context to SID"
+ "for: (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
return;
}
@@ -2931,7 +2926,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*secid = isec->sid;
}
-/* file security operations */
+/* File security operations. */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
@@ -2943,7 +2938,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
return 0;
}
- /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+ /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set. */
if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
mask |= MAY_APPEND;
@@ -3005,10 +3000,10 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
#endif
if (file) {
- /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+ /* Read access is always possible with a mapping. */
u32 av = FILE__READ;
- /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
+ /* Write access only matters if the mapping is shared. */
if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
av |= FILE__WRITE;
@@ -3103,13 +3098,13 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
break;
}
- /* fall through */
+ /* Fall through. */
case F_SETOWN:
case F_SETSIG:
case F_GETFL:
case F_GETOWN:
case F_GETSIG:
- /* Just check FD__USE permission */
+ /* Just check FD__USE permission. */
err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
break;
case F_GETLK:
@@ -3149,13 +3144,13 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
u32 perm;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
- /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+ /* Struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file. */
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
fsec = file->f_security;
if (!signum)
- perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+ perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* As per send_sigio_to_task. */
else
perm = signal_to_av(signum);
@@ -3207,7 +3202,7 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
}
/*
- * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ * Detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials.
*/
static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
@@ -3217,7 +3212,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
}
/*
- * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
*/
static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
@@ -3236,8 +3231,8 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
}
/*
- * set the security data for a kernel service
- * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
+ * Set the security data for a kernel service
+ * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled.
*/
static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
@@ -3259,8 +3254,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
}
/*
- * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
- * objective context of the specified inode
+ * Set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
+ * objective context of the specified inode.
*/
static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
@@ -3368,7 +3363,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int rc;
if (!sig)
- perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* NULL signal; existence test. */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
if (secid)
@@ -3394,7 +3389,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
isec->initialized = 1;
}
-/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses. */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
{
@@ -3475,7 +3470,7 @@ out:
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses. */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
{
@@ -3538,7 +3533,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
break;
}
- /* includes fragments */
+ /* Includes fragments. */
default:
break;
}
@@ -3546,7 +3541,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
+#endif /* IPV6. */
static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
@@ -3590,7 +3585,7 @@ okay:
}
/**
- * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet.
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @sid: the packet's peer label SID
@@ -3617,15 +3612,15 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
if (unlikely(err)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
- " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
+ "SELinux: Failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
+ " unable to determine packet's peer label.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
-/* socket security operations */
+/* Socket security operations. */
static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
u32 perms)
{
@@ -3953,11 +3948,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
if (err)
return err;
- /* connecting socket */
+ /* Connecting socket. */
ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
- /* server child socket */
+ /* Server child socket. */
ssec = newsk->sk_security;
ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
@@ -4066,7 +4061,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
- /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets. */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
@@ -4240,7 +4235,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 newsid;
u32 peersid;
- /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets. */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
@@ -4274,7 +4269,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
time it will have been created and available. */
/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
- * thread with access to newsksec */
+ * thread with access to newsksec. */
selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
}
@@ -4283,7 +4278,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets. */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
@@ -4314,14 +4309,14 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL) {
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
+ "SELinux: Unrecognized netlink message"
" type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
- /* Ignore */
+ /* Ignore. */
if (err == -ENOENT)
err = 0;
goto out;
@@ -4378,10 +4373,10 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
return NF_DROP;
if (netlbl_active)
- /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
+ /* We do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
* path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
* labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
- * protection */
+ * protection. */
if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
@@ -4406,7 +4401,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
{
return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
+#endif /* IPV6. */
static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
@@ -4416,9 +4411,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!netlbl_enabled())
return NF_ACCEPT;
- /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+ /* We do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
* because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
- * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+ * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection. */
if (skb->sk) {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
sid = sksec->sid;
@@ -4493,7 +4488,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
* packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
* since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
* when the packet is on it's final way out.
- * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
+ * NOTE: There appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
* is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
@@ -4506,7 +4501,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
/* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
* packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
* application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
- * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
+ * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid. */
sk = skb->sk;
if (sk == NULL) {
switch (family) {
@@ -4585,9 +4580,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
{
return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
+#endif /* IPV6. */
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER. */
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
@@ -4692,7 +4687,7 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
msg_msg_free_security(msg);
}
-/* message queue security operations */
+/* Message queue security operations. */
static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
@@ -4778,12 +4773,12 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
msec = msg->security;
/*
- * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+ * First time through, need to assign label to the message.
*/
if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
/*
* Compute new sid based on current process and
- * message queue this message will be stored in
+ * message queue this message will be stored in.
*/
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
&msec->sid);
@@ -4798,7 +4793,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
if (!rc)
- /* Can this process send the message */
+ /* Can this process send the message? */
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
MSG__SEND, &ad);
if (!rc)
@@ -4833,7 +4828,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
return rc;
}
-/* Shared Memory security operations */
+/* Shared Memory security operations. */
static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
@@ -4879,7 +4874,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
-/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+/* Note: At this point, shp is locked down. */
static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
{
int perms;
@@ -4925,7 +4920,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
}
-/* Semaphore security operations */
+/* Semaphore security operations. */
static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
@@ -5180,7 +5175,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (sid == 0)
goto abort_change;
- /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+ /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context. */
error = -EPERM;
if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
@@ -5277,7 +5272,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
u32 sid;
- /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
+ /* If no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
appear to be created. */
if (perm == 0)
@@ -5517,14 +5512,14 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
secondary_ops = security_ops;
if (!secondary_ops)
- panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
+ panic("SELinux: No initial security operations.\n");
if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
if (selinux_enforcing)
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode.\n");
else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode.\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -5609,7 +5604,7 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
}
};
-#endif /* IPV6 */
+#endif /* IPV6. */
static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
{
@@ -5618,7 +5613,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
if (!selinux_enabled)
goto out;
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks.\n");
err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
if (err)
@@ -5628,7 +5623,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
if (err)
panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
-#endif /* IPV6 */
+#endif /* IPV6. */
out:
return err;
@@ -5639,22 +5634,22 @@ __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
{
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks.\n");
nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
-#endif /* IPV6 */
+#endif /* IPV6. */
}
#endif
-#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER. */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
#endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER. */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static int selinux_disabled;
--
1.6.3.2
--
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