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Message-ID: <87r5wc4fdk.fsf@basil.nowhere.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2009 21:55:19 +0200
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Athanasius <link@...gy.org>, Julien TINNES <jt@....org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>,
Tavis Ormandy <taviso@....lonestar.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Eugene Teo <eugene@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [link@...gy.org: Re: [patch 2/8] personality: fix PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (CVE-2009-1895)]
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
>
> Other binaries are unhappy with address space randomization because they
> need to get the absolute maximum contiguous VM space for some big array.
> Ok, so that's less of an issue in 64-bit mode, but there really are
> programs out there that link everything statically and want to run at a
> low virtual address so that they can get 2.5GB of virtual memory for one
> single big allocation. I've written crap like that myself. I'm not _proud_
> of it, but I could easily see that programs like that could be unhappy if
> the system wiggles mmap's around for security issues.
Another common reason for not supporting randomized mappings is
when the program loads a "core file" that has pointers to data
on each boot, as a faster way to initialize data structures.
That's common with LISP like languages for example, but even
e.g. gcc's pre compiled headers implementation works like this.
> Because compatibility is always of paramount importance.
If you want to give it a security angle: not supporting
an old application anymore is a very severe DoS attack
for people using it.
-Andi
--
ak@...ux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.
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