linux-kernel - Can access to /proc/$PID/exe be relaxed?

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Message-ID: <20090721165248.GA27549@tango.0pointer.de>
Date:	Tue, 21 Jul 2009 18:52:48 +0200
From:	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Can access to /proc/$PID/exe be relaxed?

Hi!

Unless I am mistaken a process currently needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE to read
/proc/$PID/exe for abritrary processes. Does that make sense? Could
that be relaxed? Is there any reason to limit access to that link at
all? To me the data from /proc/$PID/cmdline seems to be far more
worthy to be protected than /proc/$PID/exe, or am I missing something?

Tbh, looking at the code I don't really get where CAP_SYS_PTRACE seems
to be required, but experimenting from userspace this seems to be the
case.

Lennart

-- 
Lennart Poettering                        Red Hat, Inc.
lennart [at] poettering [dot] net
http://0pointer.net/lennart/           GnuPG 0x1A015CC4
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