linux-kernel - [PATCH] information leak in sigaltstack

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Message-Id: <200907311948.n6VJm5Gf010118@hs20-bc2-1.build.redhat.com>
Date:	Fri, 31 Jul 2009 15:48:05 -0400
From:	Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...hat.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH] information leak in sigaltstack

Unfortunately the stack_t data structure was defined before people
cared much about 64-bit architectures.  It has a hole in the middle.
And this hole is creating an information leak in the sigaltstack
syscall.

When the second parameter to sigaltstack is non-NULL the current stack
information is passed to the caller by filling in the members of the
stack_t structure and then the whole structure is copied using
copy_to_user.  This unfortunately leaves the whole after flags
uninitialized.

The following patch should fix the issue.

Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...hat.com>

diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index ccf1cee..612d6b7 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2455,6 +2455,9 @@ do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *uss, stack_t __user *uoss, unsigned long s
 	int error;

 	if (uoss) {
+		if (offsetof(stack_t, ss_flags) + sizeof(oss.ss_flags) !=
+		    offsetof(stack_t, ss_size))
+			memset(&oss, '\0', sizeof(oss));
 		oss.ss_sp = (void __user *) current->sas_ss_sp;
 		oss.ss_size = current->sas_ss_size;
 		oss.ss_flags = sas_ss_flags(sp);
--
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