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Message-ID: <20090813140306.GC30731@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 09:03:06 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
sds@...ho.nsa.gov, davem@...emloft.net,
shemminger@...ux-foundation.org, kees@...ntu.com,
morgan@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com, dwalsh@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] security: introducing security_request_module
Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@...hat.com):
> Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
> new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process
> able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
> binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to
> request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
> to call request_module().
Is there a specific case in which you'd want to deny this ability
from a real task?
-serge
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