[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20090813.161450.193138821.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 16:14:50 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: paul.moore@...com
Cc: eparis@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov,
shemminger@...ux-foundation.org, kees@...ntu.com,
morgan@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com, dwalsh@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to
call request_module
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 14:45:37 -0400
> On Thursday 13 August 2009 09:44:51 am Eric Paris wrote:
>> The networking code checks CAP_SYS_MODULE before using request_module() to
>> try to load a kernel module. While this seems reasonable it's actually
>> weakening system security since we have to allow CAP_SYS_MODULE for things
>> like /sbin/ip and bluetoothd which need to be able to trigger module loads.
>> CAP_SYS_MODULE actually grants those binaries the ability to directly load
>> any code into the kernel. We should instead be protecting modprobe and the
>> modules on disk, rather than granting random programs the ability to load
>> code directly into the kernel. Instead we are going to gate those
>> networking checks on CAP_NET_ADMIN which still limits them to root but
>> which does not grant those processes the ability to load arbitrary code
>> into the kernel.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
>
> Sounds and looks reasonable to me.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
Looks fine to me:
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists